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A CASE STUDY ON STOCHASTIC GAMES ON LARGE GRAPHS IN
MEAN FIELD AND SPARSE REGIMES
DANIEL LACKER AND AGATHE SORET
Abstract. We study a class of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games in which each
player interacts directly only with its nearest neighbors in a given graph. We find a semi-
explicit Markovian equilibrium for any transitive graph, in terms of the empirical eigenvalue
distribution of the graph’s normalized Laplacian matrix. This facilitates large-population
asymptotics for various graph sequences, with several sparse and dense examples discussed
in detail. In particular, the mean field game is the correct limit only in the dense graph
case, i.e., when the degrees diverge in a suitable sense. Even though equilibrium strategies
are nonlocal, depending on the behavior of all players, we use a correlation decay estimate
to prove a propagation of chaos result in both the dense and sparse regimes, with the sparse
case owing to the large distances between typical vertices. Without assuming the graphs
are transitive, we show also that the mean field game solution can be used to construct
decentralized approximate equilibria on any sufficiently dense graph sequence.
Contents
1. Introduction 2
2. Main results 4
2.1. The model setup 4
2.2. The equilibrium 5
2.3. Asymptotic regimes 7
2.4. Examples 11
2.5. The cooperative game 15
3. Analysis of the ODE 17
4. The equilibrium on finite graphs: Proof of Theorem 2.5 21
4.1. Symmetries 21
4.2. The corresponding system of HJB equations 22
4.3. Reduction to Riccati equations 23
4.4. Checking the solution 24
4.5. State process dynamics in equilibrium 26
4.6. Computing the value of the game 27
5. A direct but heuristic proof of Theorem 2.5 28
5.1. More on symmetries 28
5.2. Heuristic solution of the HJB system 29
6. Correlation decay: Proof of Proposition 2.12 31
7. Asymptotic regimes 34
7.1. Large-scale asymptotics on transitive graphs: Proof of Theorem 2.6 35
7.2. Approximate equilibria: Proof of Theorem 2.11 37
7.3. Examples 40
References 41
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
14
10
2v
1 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
28
 M
ay
 20
20
2 DANIEL LACKER AND AGATHE SORET
1. Introduction
Mean field game (MFG) theory has enjoyed rapid development and widespread applica-
tion since its introduction over a decade and a half ago in [23, 29]. It provides a systematic
framework for studying a broad class of stochastic dynamic games with many interacting
players, in terms of limiting models featuring a continuum of players which are often more
tractable. There are by now various rigorous results justifying the MFG approximation. On
the one hand, the equilibria of n-player games can be shown to converge to the MFG limit
under suitable assumptions. On the other hand, a solution of the continuum model may
be used to construct approximate equilibria for the n-player model with the particularly
desirable properties of being decentralized and symmetric, in the sense that each player
applies an identical feedback control which ignores the states of all other players. We refer
to the recent book [9] for a thorough account of MFG theory and its many applications.
A key structural assumption of the MFG paradigm is that the players interact sym-
metrically, i.e., through an empirical measure which weights each player equally. In many
natural situations, however, players do not view each other as exchangeable and instead
interact directly only with certain subsets of players to which they are connected, e.g., via
some form of a graph or network. This is the purview of the broad field of network games,
and we refer to [24] for a representative overview of mostly static models.
Our paper contributes to a very recent line of work bridging MFG theory and network
games by studying n-player stochastic dynamic games in which interactions are governed
by a graph Gn on n vertices. (When Gn is the complete graph we recover the traditional
MFG setting.) Roughly speaking, the goal is to understand the robustness of the mean
field approximation and, when it fails, a substitute. Somewhat more precisely, two central
questions are:
(1) For what kinds of graph sequences {Gn} is the usual MFG approximation still valid?
(2) What is the right limit model for a general sequence {Gn}, and how well does it
approximate the corresponding n-player game?
Little progress has been made so far toward a systematic understanding of these questions.
The recent paper [13] addresses (1) when Gn = G(n, p) is the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph on n
vertices with fixed edge probability p ∈ (0, 1), showing that the usual MFG limit is still
valid. More recently, [17] studies a linear-quadratic model very similar to ours, but only
considering directed path or cycle graphs. In another direction, recent efforts on (2) have
proposed continuum models based on graphons, which describe limit objects for general
dense graph sequences [30]. See recent work on graphon games for the static case [8, 36] or
graphon MFGs in the dynamic case [5, 19, 40].
The combination of network, dynamic, and game-theoretic effects is essential for many
recent models of large economic and financial systems, and several recent studies have
attacked specific models combining some of these features; see [6, 10, 16, 33] and references
therein. Even without game-theoretic (strategic) features, incorporating network effects
into large-scale dynamic models already presents many mathematical challenges, which
very recent work has begun to address; see [2, 12, 32] and [14, 28, 34] for studies of dense
and sparse graph regimes, respectively. Notably, prior work studied dense graph regimes,
and most questions in the sparse regime (roughly defined as finite limiting neighborhood
sizes) remain open, as was highlighted in particular in the recent paper [5].
The purpose of our article is to give comprehensive answers to (1) and (2), in both dense
and sparse regimes, in the setting of a specific yet rich linear-quadratic model, inspired by the
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systemic risk (flocking) model of [10]. For a suitably dense graph sequence {Gn} (meaning
roughly that the degrees diverge as n→∞), we show (in Theorem 2.11) that the classical
construction of MFG theory is still valid: The MFG equilibrium gives rise to a sequence
of decentralized and symmetric approximate Nash equilibria for the n-player games. The
dense regime includes the complete graph, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph Gn = G(n, pn) with
npn → ∞, and many others. Our findings in the dense case conform to an increasingly
well-understood principle of statistical physics, that (static) interacting particle systems
(e.g., the Ising model) on sufficiently dense graphs tend to behave like their mean field
counterparts (e.g., the Curie-Weiss model); see [1] and references therein.
The case of sparse graphs is more delicate, and the MFG approximation is no longer
valid. Here we restrict our attention to (vertex) transitive graphs, which intuitively “look
the same” from the perspective of any vertex (see Definition 2.3); transitive graphs have rich
enough symmetry groups to make up for the lack of exchangeability. We compute the Mar-
kovian Nash equilibrium explicitly (in Theorem 2.5), up to the solution of a one-dimensional
ordinary differential equation (ODE) governed by the empirical eigenvalue distribution of
the Laplacian of the graph (i.e., the rate matrix of the simple random walk). As a conse-
quence, we show (in Theorem 2.6) that for a given graph sequence {Gn}, the limiting law can
be computed for a typical player’s state process, under the assumption that the empirical
eigenvalue distributions of the Laplacian matrices of the graphs converge weakly. We also
discuss (in Section 2.5) similar and much simpler results for the corresponding cooperative
problem, which we can explicitly solve for any graph (not necessarily transitive).
The eigenvalue distribution of a graph Laplacian is reasonably tractable in many inter-
esting cases. The dense graph case is precisely the case where the eigenvalue distribution
converges weakly to a point mass. In the sparse case, the eigenvalue distribution converges
to a non-degenerate limit, and we characterize the much different n→∞ behavior in terms
of this limit. We do not have a complete answer to (2) in the sparse case, as it remains
unclear how to identify the limiting dynamics intrinsically, without relying on n→∞ lim-
its of n-player models. In contrast, the MFG framework identifies an intrinsic continuum
model, the solution of which agrees with the n→∞ limit of the n-player equilibria.
A crucial challenge in the sparse setting is that equilibrium controls are not local, even
at the limit. Even though each player’s cost function depends only on the player’s neigh-
bors, the equilibrium (feedback) control depends on the entire network, requiring each
player to look beyond its nearest neighbors or even its neighbors’ neighbors. That said, we
prove a correlation decay estimate (Proposition 2.12), which shows that the covariance of
two players’ equilibrium state processes decays to zero with graph distance between these
players. Correlation decay is interesting in its own right, as it illustrates that asymptotic
independence of players can arise both in a dense graph (because degrees are large) and a
sparse graph (because typical vertices are very far apart). In addition, we use correlation
decay crucially in proving the convergence of the empirical distribution of state processes in
equilibrium to a non-random limit (propagation of chaos), for large graph sequences {Gn}.
The key mathematical difficulty in the paper lies in the semi-explicit solution of the n-
player game. As is standard for linear-quadratic n-player games, we reduce the problem to
solving a coupled system of n matrix differential equations of Riccati type. Riccati equations
of this form do not often admit explicit solutions, but assuming the graph is transitive gives
us enough symmetry to work with to derive a solution.
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2. Main results
In this section we present all the main results of the paper, and we defer proofs to
later sections. We first give the precise setup of the n-player game (Section 2.1). After
describing the semi-explicit solution of the equilibrium for transitive graphs (Section 2.2),
we then consider the large-n behavior (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), paying particular attention
to the distinction between the sparse and dense regimes. Finally, we discuss the analogous
cooperative game (Section 2.5).
2.1. The model setup. In this section we define a stochastic differential game associated
to any finite graph G = (V,E). All graphs will be simple and undirected. We abuse
notation at times by identifying G with its vertex set, e.g., by writing v ∈ G instead of
v ∈ V . Similarly, we write |G| = |V | for the cardinality of the vertex set, and RG = RV for
the space of vectors indexed by the vertices.
Each vertex v ∈ V is identified with a player, and we associate to this player a state
process on time horizon T > 0 with dynamics
dXGv (t) = αv(t,X
G(t))dt+ σdWv(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (2.1)
where σ > 0 is given, (Wv)v∈V are independent one-dimensional standard Brownian motions
defined on a given filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), and XG = (XGv )v∈V is the vector
of state processes. Players choose controls αv from the set of (full-information) Markovian
controls AG, defined as the set of Borel-measurable functions α : [0, T ]×RV → R such that
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×RV
|α(t,x)|
1 + |x| <∞.
For any α1, . . . , αn ∈ AG, the SDE system (2.1) has a unique strong solution by a result of
Veretennikov [41] (see also [27, Theorem 2.1]). The given initial statesXG(0) = (XGv (0))v∈V
are assumed non-random, and in many cases we will set them to zero for simplicity.
Each player v ∈ V faces a quadratic cost function JGv : AVG → R that depends on the
state processes of her nearest neighbors. For a non-isolated vertex v, we set
JGv ((αu)u∈V ) :=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
|αv(t,XG(t))|2dt+ c
∣∣∣∣∣XGv (T )− 1degG(v)
∑
u∼v
XGu (T )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 , (2.2)
where c > 0 is a fixed constant, degG(v) denotes the degree of vertex v, and u ∼ v means
that (u, v) is an edge in G. For an isolated vertex v (i.e., if degG(v) = 0), we set
JGv ((αu)u∈V ) :=
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|αv(t,XG(t))|2dt+ c
∣∣XGv (T )∣∣2] . (2.3)
Remark 2.1. We gain little generality by allowing G to be disconnected. Indeed, restricting
attention to the connected components of G yields decoupled games of the same form, which
we can study separately. But when we discuss Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and other random graphs, it is
useful to fix a convention for how to handle isolated vertices.
In comparison to the usual settings of mean field games (MFGs), the key feature here
is that the players do not interact with each other equally, but rather each player interacts
(directly) only with her nearest neighbors in the graph. The form of the cost function
implies indeed that each player, in addition to minimizing a standard quadratic energy
term, will try to be as close as possible to the average of her nearest neighbors at the final
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time. For this reason, we can think of this as a flocking model. The benchmark case to keep
in mind is where G is the complete graph on n vertices, which corresponds to the usual
MFG setup.
The first goal is to find a Markovian Nash equilibrium for this game, formally defined
as follows, along with some generalizations. We write R+ = [0,∞) throughout the paper.
Definition 2.2. For a graph G on vertex set V = {1, . . . , n} and a vector  = (i)ni=1 ∈ Rn+,
we say that a vector α∗ = (α∗i )
n
i=1 ∈ AnG of admissible strategies is a (Markovian) -Nash
equilibrium on G if
JGi (α
∗) ≤ inf
α∈AG
JGi (α
∗
1, ..., α
∗
i−1, α, α
∗
i+1, ..., α
∗
n) + i, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
The corresponding equilibrium state process XG = (XGi )
n
i=1 is the solution of the SDE
dXGi (t) = α
∗
i (t,X
G(t))dt+ σdWi(t).
When the graph is understood from context, we may omit the qualifier “on G.” When 1 =
· · · = n =  for some  ≥ 0, we refer to α∗ as a -Nash equilibrium instead of a (, . . . , )-
Nash equilibrium. Naturally, a 0-Nash equilibrium is simply called a Nash equilibrium.
The notion of -Nash equilibrium for  ≥ 0 is standard and means that no player can
reduce her cost by more than  by a unilateral change in control. The more general notion of
 = (i)
n
i=1-Nash equilibrium stated here is less standard, and it simply means that different
players may stand to improve their costs by different amounts. Of course, a  = (i)
n
i=1-
Nash equilibrium is also a δ-Nash equilibrium for δ = maxni=1 i. But this distinction will
be useful in asymptotic statements (as in the discussion after Theorem 2.11), because the
statement limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 
n
i = 0 is of course much weaker than limn→∞max
n
i=1 
n
i = 0 for
triangular arrays {ni : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ⊂ R+.
2.2. The equilibrium. To solve the game described in Section 2.1, we impose a symmetry
assumption on the underlying graph. Let Aut(G) denote the set of automorphisms of
the graph G = (V,E), i.e., bijections ϕ : V → V such that (u, v) ∈ E if and only if
(ϕ(u), ϕ(v)) ∈ E. One should think of an automorphism as simply a relabeling of the
graph.
Definition 2.3. We say G is (vertex) transitive if for every u, v ∈ V there exists ϕ ∈ Aut(G)
such that ϕ(u) = v.
Essentially, a transitive graph “looks the same” from the perspective of each vertex.
Importantly, the game we are studying is clearly invariant under actions of Aut(G), in the
sense that the equilibrium state process (if unique) should satisfy (XGv )v∈V
d
= (XGϕ(v))v∈V
for each ϕ ∈ Aut(G). In the MFG setting, i.e., when G is the complete graph, Aut(G)
is the set of all permutations of the vertex set, and the Aut(G)-invariance of the random
vector XG is better known as exchangeability. For a general graph, Aut(G) is merely a
subgroup of the full permutation group, and we lose exchangeability. While the transitivity
of G is a strong assumption, it is not surprising that a sufficiently rich group of symmetries
would help us maintain some semblance of the tractability of MFG theory which stems
from exchangeability. Transitivity, in particular, ensures that we still have XGv
d
= XGu in
equilibrium, for each v, u ∈ V .
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We need the following notation. Let AG denote the adjacency matrix of a graph G on
n verties, and let DG = diag(degG(1), ...,degG(n)) be the diagonal matrix of the degrees.
If G has no isolated vertices (i.e., all degrees are nonzero), we define the Laplacian1 by
LG := D
−1
G AG − I,
where I is the identity matrix. It is easy to see that a transitive graph G is always regular,
meaning each vertex has the same degree, which we denote δ(G). The Laplacian matrix
then becomes LG =
1
δ(G)AG − I, which is notably a symmetric matrix.
Remark 2.4. Throughout the paper, we will make frequent use of the fact that LG has real
eigenvalues, all of which are between −2 and 0. Indeed, note that LG = D−1/2G L˜GD1/2G where
L˜G = D
−1/2
G AGD
−1/2
G − I is the symmetric normalized Laplacian, and thus the eigenvalues
of LG and L˜G are the same; the properties of L˜G are summarized in [11, Sections 1.2 and
1.3]. Note that the all-ones vector is an eigenvector of LG with eigenvalue 0.
Our first main result is the following:
Theorem 2.5 (Characterization of equilibrium on transitive graphs). Suppose G is a finite
transitive graph on n vertices without isolated vertices. Define QG : R+ → R+ by
QG(x) := (det(I − xLG))1/n, for x ∈ R+. (2.4)
Then QG : R+ → R+ is well defined and continuously differentiable, and there exists a
unique solution fG : [0, T ]→ R+ to the ODE
f ′G(t) = cQ
′
G(fG(t)), fG(0) = 0.
Define PG : [0, T ]→ Rn×n by
PG(t) := −f ′G(T − t)LG
(
I − fG(T − t)LG
)−1
, (2.5)
and finally define αGi ∈ AG for i ∈ G by
αGi (t,x) = −eTi PG(t)x,
where (ev)v∈G is the standard Euclidean basis in RG. Then (αGi )i∈G is a Nash equilibrium.
For each t ∈ (0, T ], the equilibrium state process XG(t) is normally distributed with mean
vector (I − fG(T − t)LG)(I − fG(T )LG)−1XG(0) and covariance matrix
σ2(I − fG(T − t)LG)2
∫ t
0
(I − fG(T − s)LG)−2ds.
Finally, writing | · | for the Euclidean norm, the time-zero average value is
Val(G) :=
1
n
∑
v∈G
JGv ((α
G
i )i∈G) =
|PG(0)XG(0)|2
2Tr(PG(0))
− σ
2
2
log
Tr(PG(0))
nf ′G(T )
. (2.6)
The proof is given in Section 4. As usual, we first reduce our (linear-quadratic) game
to a system of matrix differential equations of Riccati type in Section 4.2. In our setting
we can explicitly solve these Riccati equations using symmetry arguments based on the
transitivity assumption.
It is interesting to note that the equilibrium controls αGi obtained in Theorem 2.5 are
nonlocal, in the sense that the control of player i depends on the states of all of the players,
1In the literature, there are several different matrices derived from a graph which go by the name Lapla-
cian. Our matrix LG is sometimes called the random walk normalized Laplacian (or the negative thereof).
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not just the neighbors. Naive intuition would suggest that players should only look at the
states of their neighbors, because the objective of each player is to align at time T with
those neighbors. On the contrary, a rational player anticipates that her neighbors will in
turn try to align with their own neighbors, which leads the player to follow the states of
the neighbors’ neighbors, and similarly the neighbors’ neighbors’ neighbors, and so on.
It is worth noting that in the setting of Theorem 2.5 we have
E
[
1
n
∑
v∈G
XGv (t)
]
=
1
n
∑
v∈G
XGv (0).
That is, the average location of the players stays constant over time, in equilibrium. Indeed,
this follows easily from the formula for the mean E[XG(t)] and from the fact that the vector
of all ones is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 0 for the symmetric matrix LG.
We suspect that the Markovian Nash equilibrium identified in Theorem 2.5 is the unique
one. This could likely be proven along the lines of [9, Section II.6.3.1], but for the sake of
brevity we do not attempt to do so.
2.3. Asymptotic regimes. The form of the equilibrium computed in Theorem 2.5 lends
itself well to large-n asymptotics after a couple of observations. First, for simplicity, we
focus on the case XG(0) = 0. Transitivity of the graph G (or Lemma 4.1) ensures that
XGi (t)
d
= XGj (t) for all i, j ∈ G and t > 0, and we deduce that each XGi (t) is a centered
Gaussian with variance
Var(XGi (t)) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
Var(XGk (t))
=
σ2
n
Tr
[
(I − fG(T − t)LG)2
∫ t
0
(I − fG(T − s)LG)−2ds
]
=
σ2
n
n∑
k=1
∫ t
0
(
1− fG(T − t)λGk
1− fG(T − s)λGk
)2
ds, (2.7)
where λG1 , . . . , λ
G
n are the eigenvalues of LG, repeated by multiplicity. The average over k =
1, . . . , n can be written as an integral with respect to the empirical eigenvalue distribution,
µG :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δλGi
, (2.8)
which we recall is supported on [−2, 0], as in Remark 2.4. The other quantities in Theorem
2.5 can also be expressed in terms of µG. Indeed, the value Val(G) becomes
Val(G) = −σ
2
2
log
Tr(PG(0))
nf ′G(T )
= −σ
2
2
log
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− fG(T )λµG(dλ), (2.9)
and the function QG defined in (2.4) becomes
QG(x) =
(
n∏
i=1
(1− xλGi )
)1/n
= exp
∫
[−2,0]
log(1− xλ)µG(dλ).
Thus, if we are given a sequence of graphs Gn such that µGn converges weakly to some
probability measure, it is natural to expect the equilibrium computed in Theorem 2.5 to
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converge in some sense. This is the content of our next main result, which we prove in
Section 7:
Theorem 2.6 (Large-scale asymptotics on transitive graphs). Let {Gn} be a sequence of fi-
nite transitive graphs without isolated vertices, with limn→∞ |Gn| =∞. Let XGn denote the
equilibrium state process identified in Theorem 2.5, started from initial position XGn(0) = 0.
Suppose µGn converges weakly to a probability measure µ, and define Qµ : R+ → R+ by
Qµ(x) := exp
∫
[−2,0]
log(1− xλ)µ(dλ).
Then the following holds:
(1) There exists a unique solution fµ : [0, T ]→ R+ of the ODE
f ′µ(t) = cQ
′
µ(fµ(t)), fµ(0) = 0. (2.10)
(2) For any vertex sequence kn ∈ Gn and any t ∈ [0, T ], the law of XGnkn (t) converges
weakly as n→∞ to the Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance
Vµ(t) = σ
2
∫ t
0
∫
[−2,0]
(
1− λfµ(T − t)
1− λfµ(T − s)
)2
µ(dλ)ds. (2.11)
(3) For any t ∈ [0, T ], the (random) empirical measure 1|Gn|
∑
i∈Gn δXGni (t) converges
weakly in probability as n→∞ to the (non-random) Gaussian distribution N (0, Vµ(t)).
(4) The time-zero values given in (2.6) with XGn(0) = 0 converge:
lim
n→∞Val(Gn) = −
σ2
2
log
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− λfµ(T )µ(dλ). (2.12)
There are many concrete graph sequences {Gn} for which µGn can be shown to converge
to a tractable (typically continuous) limiting measure, and we document several notable
cases in Section 2.4. The Laplacian spectrum is in fact quite tractable and well-studied.
There is a substantial literature on the eigenvalues of Laplacian (and other) matrices of
graphs [11, 22], which are well known to encode significant structural information about
the graph. It is arguably more natural a priori to state instead that the graph sequence Gn
itself has some asymptotic structure in some sense, which might be formalized using one of
the many several notions of graph limits in the literature. In particular, the notion of local
weak convergence has proven to be quite powerful and natural in the sparse setting; see [39]
for a thorough treatment, as well as [28, 34] for some recent work applying this framework
to analyze large-scale interacting diffusion models on sparse graphs. We will not define
local weak convergence here, but we highlight that the local weak convergence of Gn → G
is known to imply the weak convergence of µGn to a certain spectral measure µ, under
mild technical conditions [3]. This spectral measure is defined intrinsically on a general
finite or countable (locally finite) graph G = (V,E) by applying the spectral theorem to an
appropriately defined Laplacian operator on the complex Hilbert space `2(V ), and in the
finite (transitive) graph case this coincides exactly with the empirical eigenvalue distribution
defined in (2.8).
Remark 2.7. We develop in Section 3 some noteworthy qualitative and quantitative prop-
erties of the equilibrium variance Vµ(t) given in (2.11). We show in Proposition 3.3 that
Vµ(0) = 0, V
′
µ(0) = σ
2, and V ′′µ (0) = −2σ2(f ′µ(T ))2/cQµ(fµ(T )). In particular, for short
times, the leading-order behavior Vµ(t) = σ
2t + o(t) does not depend on the underlying
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graph. It is only at the second order or at longer time horizons that the influence of the
graph is felt.
Remark 2.8. The restriction to XGn(0) = 0 in Theorem 2.6 is merely to simplify the
resulting formulas. One could easily accommodate the more general setting in which the
empirical measure of initial states converges to some limiting distribution. In addition,
a functional version of Theorem 2.6 can likely be derived under no further assumptions,
in which the Gaussian process (XGnkn (t))t∈[0,T ] converges weakly in C([0, T ]) to a limiting
Gaussian process. We omit these generalizations, as the more complicated statements do
not shed any light on the role of the network structure, which is the main focus of our work.
2.3.1. Dense graphs. If Gn is the complete graph, then it turns out that µGn =
1
nδ0 +
n−1
n δ−n/(n−1) → δ−1, which leads to a simpler form for the limiting law in (2.11). More
generally, the case µGn → δ−1 represents a “dense” regime, as described in the following
result. Recall that all transitive graphs are regular, meaning each vertex has the same
degree. The following is proven in Section 7.3:
Corollary 2.9 (Large-scale asymptotics on dense transitive graphs). Suppose {Gn} is a
sequence of transitive graphs, and suppose each vertex of Gn has common degree δ(Gn) ≥ 1.
Then µGn → δ−1 if and only if δ(Gn) → ∞. In this case, the limiting variance (2.11) and
value (2.12) simplify to
Vδ−1(t) = σ
2t
1 + c(T − t)
1 + cT
, lim
n→∞Val(Gn) =
σ2
2
log(1 + cT ). (2.13)
Moreover, there is a constant C <∞, depending only on c and T , such that
|VGn(t)− Vδ−1(t)|+
∣∣∣Val(Gn)− σ22 log(1 + cT )∣∣∣ ≤ C/δ(Gn), ∀n ∈ N, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.14)
Finally, the Gaussian law N (0, Vδ−1(t)) is precisely the time-t law of the unique solution of
the SDE
dX(t) = − cX(t)
1 + c(T − t)dt+ σdW (t), X(0) = 0. (2.15)
Corollary 2.9 shows that the dense regime is particularly tractable. In particular, the
mean field case (where Gn is the complete graph) is universal in the sense that the same
limit arises for any other transitive graph sequence with diverging degree. Moreover, the rate
C/δ(Gn) in (2.14) becomes C/n in the mean field case, which is the best-known convergence
rate for the value functions of well-behaved MFGs [7, Theorem 2.13].
Remark 2.10. We show in Proposition 3.4 that the dense graph regime uniquely achieves
the lowest possible variance; precisely, we have Vµ(t) ≥ Vδ−1(t), recalling the definitions
(2.11) and (2.13), with equality only when µ = δ−1. The example of the torus graphs in
Section 2.4.3 below illustrates what appears to be a general principle, that a highly connected
graph has smaller variance in equilibrium. This makes intuitive sense, as a higher degree
means each player has a larger set of neighbors to be attracted toward.
Our next result shows that in the dense regime we may use the limiting object to
construct approximate equilibria for n-player games on general large dense graphs (not
necessarily transitive), in the same way that the equilibrium of a MFG can be used to build
approximate equilibria for finite games.
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Theorem 2.11 (Approximate equilibria on general dense graphs). Suppose G is a finite
graph. For each vertex v of G, define a control
αMFv (t,x) :=
−cxv
1 + c(T − t) , t ∈ [0, T ], x = (xu)u∈G ∈ R
G.
Finally, define G = (Gv )v∈G ∈ RG+ by
Gv :=
{
σ2 cT1+cT
√
cT (2+cT )
degG(v)
if degG(v) ≥ 1
0 if degG(v) = 0.
Then, for each n, (αMFv )v∈G is an G-Nash equilibrium on G. In particular, if
2
G := σ
2 cT
1 + cT
√
cT (2 + cT )
1 ∨ δ(G) , where δ(G) := minv∈G degG(v),
then (αMFv )v∈G is a G-Nash equilibrium on G.
We use the notation αMFv because this is precisely the control one obtains from the
corresponding MFG (see Lemma 7.2). Hence, Theorem 2.11 says that on a graph sequence
with “diverging degree” in some sense, the MFG provides a (decentralized, symmetric) ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium. More precisely, if {Gn} is a sequence of graphs with diverging
minimal degree δ(Gn) → ∞, then the controls αn := (αMFv )v∈Gn form an approximate
equilibrium, in the sense that αn is an Gn-Nash equilibrium for each n with limn Gn = 0.
Of course, the now-classical theory of MFGs tells us the same thing when Gn is the com-
plete graph (see, e.g., [9, Section II.6.1], or [23, Theorem 12] for the standard rate of
Gn = O(1/
√
n)), but Theorem 2.11 gives a threshold of how dense the graph needs to be
in order for the mean field approximation to remain valid. The constant Gn shows quanti-
tatively how the accuracy of the mean field approximation depends on the “denseness” of
the graph, as measured by the minimal degree. Some examples beyond the complete graph
will be discussed in Section 2.4 below.
In fact, we may relax the denseness threshold if we are happy to assert that (αMFv )v∈Gn
form an approximate equilibrium in a weaker sense, suggested by the most general form of
Definition 2.2. A small fraction of players (namely, those with small degree) might have a
lot to gain by deviating, but this potential gain from deviation is small when averaged over
all players. Precisely, suppose that instead of the minimum degree diverging, we suppose
merely that degrees diverge in the following averaged sense:
lim
n→∞
1
|Gn|
∑
v∈Gn
(degGn(v))
−1/2 = 0. (2.16)
Then (αMFv )v∈Gn is an Gn-Nash equilibrium, and limn
1
n
∑n
i=1 
Gn
i = 0.
In summary, different manners of quantifying the concept of approximate equilibrium
lead to different sparsity/denseness thresholds for the validity of the mean field approxima-
tion. The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi case in Section 2.4.4 gives a concrete example.
2As usual, we write a ∨ b := max{a, b}.
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2.3.2. Correlation decay and asymptotic independence. Before discussing examples, we lastly
present an estimate of correlation decay, which is crucial in the proof of convergence of the
empirical measure in Theorem 2.6, and which also reveals what form of asymptotic inde-
pendence between the players can be expected.
Proposition 2.12 (Correlation decay on transitive graphs). Let G be a finite transitive
graph without isolated vertices, and let XG denote the equilibrium state process identified
in Theorem 2.5. Suppose each vertex of G has degree δ(G) ∈ N. For vertices u, v ∈ G, let
dG(u, v) denote the graph distance, defined as the length of the shortest path from u to v
(and ∞ if no such path exists). Let γ = cT/(1 + cT ) ∈ (0, 1). Then
|Cov(XGu (t), XGv (t))| ≤ 2σ2t
γdG(u,v)
(
1 + dG(u, v)(1− γ)
)
δ(G)(1− γ)2 1{dG(u,v)<∞}. (2.17)
Note that the right-hand side of (2.17) is a bounded function of δ(G) and dG(u, v). If
Gn is the complete graph on n vertices (i.e., the mean field case), then δ(Gn) = n−1→∞,
and each pair of players (in equilibrium) becomes asymptotically independent as n → ∞.
This is an instance of the phenomenon of propagation of chaos for mean field systems. More
generally, this remains true for any dense graph sequence, i.e., whenever δ(Gn)→∞.
On the other hand, the picture is rather different for a sparse graphs sequence, i.e.,
when supn δ(Gn) < ∞. An arbitrary pair of players can no longer be expected to become
asymptotically independent as n→∞, but only distant players. More precisely, two players
un, vn ∈ Gn become asymptotically independent only if dGn(un, vn) → ∞ (since γ < 1).
For a transitive graph sequence with |Gn| → ∞ and supn δ(Gn) <∞, it is always the case
that the distance between two uniformly random vertices converges to infinity in probability,
and it follows that two (uniformly) randomly chosen players are asymptotically independent,
which in turn implies the convergence of the empirical measure to a non-random limit in
Theorem 2.6. See Section 6 for details.
In summary, for a sequence of (transitive) graphs Gn with |Gn| → ∞, asymptotic
independence of a typical pair of players arises for one of two quite distinct reasons. Either:
(1) The degree diverges, and each player interacts with many other players, with pair-
wise interaction strengths of order 1/δ(Gn)→ 0.
(2) The degrees stay bounded, but typical players are very far apart in the graph and
thus very weakly correlated.
2.4. Examples. In this section we specialize the results of Section 2.3 to a short (and by
no means exhaustive) list of somewhat tractable natural large-graph models. We focus on
cases where the minimum degree and/or the empirical eigenvalue distribution of the graph
are tractable, as these quantities are particularly relevant to the main results of Section 2.3.
2.4.1. The complete graph. Let us summarize what we have mentioned regarding the sim-
plest (mean field) case, where Gn is the complete graph on n vertices. In this case, the
Laplacian matrix takes the form
LGn =
1
n− 1(J − I)− I,
where J is the matrix of all ones. From this we easily deduce that the eigenvalues of LGn
are 0 and − nn−1 , with respective multiplicities 1 and n − 1. Hence, µGn → δ−1, and the
degree δ(Gn) = n− 1→∞. The complete graph is of course transitive, and all of our main
theorems apply, in particular Corollary 2.9.
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In the complete graph setting, our model essentially becomes the  = q = 0 case of [10].
The only difference is that in [10] each player is included in the empirical average; that is,
the terminal cost of player k is | 1n
∑
xi−xk|2 instead of | 1n−1
∑
i 6=k xi−xk|2. This can easily
be fit into our framework, as the following remark explains.
Remark 2.13. For a finite transitive graph G without isolated vertices, every vertex has
a common degree δ(G). Letting Nv(G) denote the union of {v} and the set of neighbors of
a vertex v in G, we can write the terminal cost function for player v as∣∣∣∣∣ 1δ(G) ∑
u∼v
xu − xv
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
(
δ(G) + 1
δ(G)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1δ(G) + 1
∑
u∈Nv(G)
xu − xv
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Hence, we can modify our setup so that each each player is included in the average in the
terminal cost, simply by modifying the constant c by a factor of (1 + 1/δ(G))2.
2.4.2. The cycle graph. Suppose now that Gn = Cn is the cycle on n vertices. This is a
transitive graph in which every vertex has common degree δ(Cn) = 2. The adjacency matrix
ACn is a circulant matrix, which makes it easy to calculate the eigenvalues as 2 cos(2pik/n)
for k = 1, . . . , n. The eigenvalues of the Laplacian LCn =
1
2ACn − I are thus λCnk =
cos(2pik/n) − 1 for k = 1, . . . , n. In this case, for a bounded continuous function f we
compute∫
f dµCn =
1
n
n∑
k=1
f(cos(2pik/n)− 1)→
∫ 1
0
f(cos(2piu)− 1) du, as n→∞,
which shows that µCn converges weakly to the probability measure µ given by the law of
cos(2piU)− 1, where U is uniform in [0, 1], i.e., µ(dx) = 1[−2,0](x) dx
pi
√
−x(2+x) . The function
Qµ in Theorem 2.6 is then
Qµ(x) = exp
∫ 1
0
log
(
1 + x− x cos(2piu))du, x ≥ 0. (2.18)
In Section 7.3.2 we derive a semi-explicit solution of the ODE (2.10) in this setting:
Proposition 2.14. Define Qµ as in (2.18). Then Qµ(x) =
1
2(
√
1 + 2x + x + 1), and the
unique solution of the ODE f ′µ(t) = cQ′µ(fµ(t)) with fµ(0) = 0 is given by
fµ(t) = Φ
−1
(
log 2 +
ct− 1
2
)
,
where Φ−1 is the inverse of the strictly increasing function Φ : R+ → R+ defined by
Φ(x) := log(1 +
√
1 + 2x)−√1 + 2x+ x+ 12 .
The variance from (2.11) then becomes
Vµ(t) = σ
2
∫ t
0
∫ 1
0
1− (cos(2piu)− 1)Φ−1
(
log 2 + c(T−t)−12
)
1− (cos(2piu)− 1)Φ−1
(
log 2 + c(T−s)−12
)
2 du ds. (2.19)
This does not appear to simplify further, but Figure 1 gives plots for various c. Note
that the variance in the dense case is always lower than in the cycle case, as we show in
Proposition 3.3. In both cases, the variance at any fixed time t decreases with c. As c→∞,
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the variance Vµ(t) in both the dense and cycle graph cases can be shown to converge to
σ2t(T − t)/T , which is the same as that of a Brownian bridge.
Figure 1. Variance of a typical player over time in the dense graph (dashed
lines, equation (2.13)) and in the cycle graph (solid lines, equation (2.19))
for different values of c. Here T = σ = 1.
2.4.3. The torus. For d ∈ N, consider the torus Gn = Zdn := Zd/nZd. That is, this graph
is the subgraph of the integer lattice Zd with vertex set {1, . . . , nd} and with “wrapping
around” at the boundary. The eigenvalues of LZdn are easily computed from those of LCn , the
cycle graph from the previous section, after noting that Zdn is the d-fold Cartesian product
of the cycle Cn with itself. In particular, if G and H are two graphs, and AG and AH have
eigenvalues (ηGv )v∈G and (ηHv )v∈H respectively, then the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix
of the Cartesian product of G and H are given by (ηGv + η
H
u )u∈G,v∈H .
3 In particular, the
eigenvalues of AZdn are
d∑
i=1
2 cos(2piki/n), k = (k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zdn.
Noting that each vertex in Zdn has degree 2d, we find that the eigenvalues of LZdn =
1
2dAZdn−I
are
λ
Zdn
k =
1
d
d∑
i=1
cos(2piki/n)− 1, k = (k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zdn.
Hence, for a bounded continuous function f we compute∫
f dµZdn =
1
|Zdn|
∑
k∈Zdn
fµ(λ
Zdn
k ) =
1
nd
n∑
k1,...,kd=1
f
(
1
d
d∑
i=1
cos(2piki/n)− 1
)
→
∫
[0,1]d
f
(
1
d
d∑
i=1
cos(2piui)− 1
)
du, as n→∞,
3See Chapter 7.14 of [22] for definition of the Cartesian product of graphs and Chapter 9.7 for a derivation
of the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of a Cartesian product.
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which shows that µZdn converges weakly to the probability measure µ given by the law of
1
d
∑d
i=1 cos(2piUi)− 1, where U1, . . . , Ud are independent uniform random variables in [0, 1].
The function Qµ in Theorem 2.6 is then
Qµ(x) = exp
∫
[0,1]d
log
(
1 + x− x
d
d∑
i=1
cos(2piui)
)
du. (2.20)
We cannot evaluate (2.20) or the solution f of the ODE (2.10) explicitly, for the torus
of dimension d > 1 (the case d = 1 is the cycle graph). But we can easily do so numerically.
Figure 2 shows the variance Vµ(t) of (2.11) for the torus of various dimensions, compared
with the dense graph case. Notably, the variance decreases with the dimension d, supporting
the intuition that a more highly connected graph leads to a behavior closer to the mean
field regime.
Figure 2. Variance of a typical player over time in the torus of dimensions
d = 1, 2, 3, 4 and the dense case. Here T = c = σ = 1.
2.4.4. Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs. Most of our main results require a transitive graph and thus
have little to say about classical random graph models, such as Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, random regular
graphs, or the configuration model, which generate graphs which are non-transitive with
high probability. In particular, in applications of Theorems 2.5 and 2.6 we cannot take any
advantage of the vast body of literature on the behavior of the eigenvalue distribution of
the adjacency and Laplacian matrices of these (non-transitive) random graph models. That
said, we mention here some noteworthy dense random graph models, to which Theorem
2.11 applies and shows that the MFG approximation is valid.
For the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphG(n, pn), it is known that as n→∞ with lim infn npn/ log n >
1, the minimal degree converges to infinity in probability [15, Lemma 6.5.2]. Hence, Theo-
rem 2.11 applies in this regime to give a random sequence n ≥ 0 converging to zero in prob-
ability such that (αMFv )v∈Gn is an n-Nash equilibrium for each n. This is sharp in a sense,
because pn > log n/n is precisely the threshold for connectedness: If lim supn npn/ log n < 1,
then G(n, pn) contains isolated vertices with high probability (in particular, the minimal
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degree is 1), and we cannot expect αMFv to be near-optimal for v in a small connected com-
ponent. This might be compared to the main result of [13], which keeps pn = p constant as
n → ∞ and finds likewise that the usual MFG approximation is valid for a class of games
on the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph.
If we relax our concept of approximate equilibrium, as in the discussion after Theorem
2.11, then we may push the denseness threshold all the way to npn →∞. That is, if npn →
∞, then a straightforward calculation using the fact that degGn(v) ∼ Binomial(n − 1, pn)
shows that
E
[
1
n
n∑
v=1
(1 ∨ degGn(v))−1/2
]
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pkn(1− pn)n−k−1(1 ∨ k)−1/2 → 0,
which ensures by Theorem 2.11 that there exist random (graph-dependent) variables n =
(nv )
n
v=1 such that
1
n
∑n
v=1 
n
v → 0 in probability and (αMFv )v∈Gn forms a n-Nash equilibrium.
Note that this threshold npn → ∞ means that the expected degree (of a randomly chosen
vertex) diverges.
In the extremely sparse (diluted) regime limn npn = θ ∈ (0,∞), the degree of a typical
vertex converges in law to Poisson(θ), and Theorem 2.11 yields no information.
These thresholds are in line with recent work on interacting particle systems (without
game or control). For example, interacting particle systems on either the complete graph
or the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph G(n, pn) converge to the same mean field (McKean-Vlasov) limit
as soon as npn →∞ [2, 35]. This is clearly the minimal sparsity threshold for which we can
expect a mean field behavior, as evidenced by recent work in the extremely sparse (diluted)
regime where npn converges to a finite non-zero constant [28, 34].
2.4.5. Random regular graphs. Random regular graphs are well known to admit tractable
large-scale behavior, in both the dense and sparse regimes. Let dn ∈ N\{1}, and let R(n, dn)
denote a uniformly random choice of dn-regular graph on n vertices. In the dense regime,
where dn →∞, Theorem 2.11 lets us construct approximate equilibria. In the sparse regime,
when dn = d is constant, the empirical measure µR(n,d) is known to converge weakly to an
explicit continuous probability measure µ(dλ) known as (an affine transformation of) the
Kesten-McKay law [25, 31], with density given by
λ 7→
√
4(d− 1)− d2(λ+ 1)2
2pi(1− (λ+ 1)2) 1{|1+λ|≤2
√
d−1/d}.
The same limit µ arises for any sequence Gn of d-regular graphs satisfying limn→∞
Ck(Gn)
|Gn| =
0 for each k ∈ N, where Ck(Gn) is the number of cycles of length k in Gn, by [31]. Note
that we cannot apply our main results to the random regular graph Gn = R(n, d) for d
fixed, because Gn is then transitive with vanishing probability as n → ∞; in fact, Gn has
trivial automorphism group with high probability [26].
2.5. The cooperative game. For comparison, we discuss the corresponding cooperative
game, which can be solved easily even without assuming transitivity of the underlying finite
graph G = (V,E). In the setup of Section 2.1, consider the optimal control problem
inf
α∈AVG
∑
v∈V
JGv (α).
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Let us abbreviate L = LG for the Laplacian. The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation is{
∂tv(t,x)− 12 |∇v(t,x)|2 + 12σ2∆v(t,x) = 0, (t,x) ∈ (0, T )× RV ,
v(T,x) = c2 |Lx|2 = c2x>L>Lx,
and the optimal control is α∗ = −∇v. Using the ansatz v(t,x) = 12x>F (t)x + h(t), for
some symmetric matrix F (t), the HJB becomes
1
2
xTF ′(t)x+ h′(t)− 1
2
x>F 2(t)x+
1
2
σ2Tr(F (t)) = 0, (t,x) ∈ (0, T )× RV ,
with terminal conditions F (T ) = cL>L and h(T ) = 0. Matching coefficients, we deduce
that F and h must solve{
F ′(t)− F 2(t) = 0, F (T ) = cL>L,
h′(t) + 12σ
2Tr(F (t)) = 0, h(T ) = 0.
We find that the solution to this system is given by
F (t) = cL>L(I + c(T − t)L>L)−1 = − d
dt
log(I + c(T − t)L>L),
where the log of the positive definite matrix is defined via power series, and
h(t) =
σ2
2
Tr log(I + c(T − t)L>L) = σ
2
2
log det(I + c(T − t)L>L).
The optimal control is α(t,x) = −F (t)x, and the optimal state process follows
dX(t) = −F (t)X(t) + σdW (t).
This SDE can be explicitly solved, and the law of X(t) is Gaussian with mean (I +
cTL>L)(I + c(T − t)L>L)−1X(0) and covariance matrix
σ2
∫ t
0
(I + c(T − t)L>L)2(I + c(T − s)L>L)−2ds.
In particular, if the graph G is transitive, we compute for each i ∈ V as in the beginning of
Section 2.3 that
Var(Xi(t)) = σ
2
∫ t
0
∫
[−2,0]
(
1 + c(T − t)λ2
1 + c(T − s)λ2
)2
µG(dλ)ds.
And if X(0) = 0, then the per-player value is
1
|V | infα∈AVG
∑
v∈V
JGv (α) =
1
|V |v(0, 0) =
σ2
2
∫
[−2,0]
log(1 + cTλ2)µG(dλ).
It is interesting to compare these outcomes to the competitive equilibrium computed in
Theorem 2.6. In the competitive case, the function f(t) = fµ(t) may be seen as determining
the rate of flocking ; as f(t) increases over time, players expend more effort to move toward
the average. In the competitive case, this function depends crucially on the graph, and it
simplifies to f(t) = ct in the dense graph case. In the cooperative case, we always have
f(t) = ct, but the solution is governed by the squared Laplacian instead of the Laplacian
itself. Figure 3 shows the variance over time for the competitive and cooperative solutions
on the (limiting) cycle graph.
In addition to being an interesting point of comparison for the competitive case, we
highlight the cooperative model also in connection with mean field control theory. We are
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Figure 3. Variance of a typical player over time in the cycle graph, in the
competitive versus cooperative regimes. Here T = σ = c = 1.
not the first to study stochastic optimal control problems on large graphs, but we do not
know of much other work other than the recent papers [20, 21], which focus on the graphon
setting and do not seem to offer any explicit examples.
Organization of the rest of the paper. The rest of the paper is devoted to the proofs
of the results stated in this section. We begin in Section 3 with an analysis of the functions
QG and Qµ and the ODEs for fG and fµ which appear in Theorems 2.5 and 2.6. Section 4
then gives the proof of Theorem 2.5. This proof is essentially a verification argument and
does not explain how to derive the announced solution, so in Section 5 we give a sketch
of a direct derivation. Section 6 proves the covariance bound of Proposition 2.12. Finally,
Section 7 proves Theorem 2.6, Theorem 2.11, and some claims of Section 2.4.
3. Analysis of the ODE
In this section, we derive several useful results about the ODEs encountered in Theorems
2.5 and 2.6. For a probability measure µ on [−2, 0], define the function
Qµ(x) = exp
∫
[−2,0]
log(1− xλ)µ(dλ), x ≥ 0. (3.1)
Note that the support of µ ensures that Qµ(x) is well-defined and infinitely differentiable
for x ≥ 0. Note that if µ = µG for a finite graph G, recalling the notation of Section 2.3,
then Qµ = QG takes the form of a normalized determinant as in (2.4).
We restrict to probability measures on [−2, 0] in this section precisely because µG is
supported on [−2, 0] for every finite graph G, as discussed in Remark 2.4. In addition,
because the adjacency matrix of a (simple) graph has zero trace, the Laplacian matrix of a
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graph on n vertices therefore has trace −n. In particular,∫
[−2,0]
xµG(dx) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
λGi =
1
n
Tr(LG) = −1, (3.2)
for a finite graph G on n vertices with Laplacian eigenvalues (λG1 , . . . , λ
G
n ). We thus restrict
our attention to the set PLap of probability measures on [−2, 0] with mean −1, equipped
with the topology of weak convergence (i.e., µn → µ in PLap if
∫
f dµn →
∫
f dµ for each
continuous function f : [−2, 0]→ R).
We will make repeated use of the following formulas for the first two derivatives of Qµ,
computed via straightforward calculus:
Q′µ(x) = Qµ(x)
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− xλ µ(dλ), (3.3)
Q′′µ(x) = Qµ(x)
(∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− xλ µ(dλ)
)2
−
∫
[−2,0]
λ2
(1− xλ)2 µ(dλ)
 .
Proposition 3.1. For each µ ∈ PLap, the function Qµ : R+ → R+ defined in (3.1) satisfies
1 ≤ Qµ(x) ≤ 1 + x, 0 < Q′µ(x) ≤ 1, −4 ≤ Q′′µ(x) ≤ 0,
for all x ∈ R+, as well as
Q′µ(x) ≥ 1− (x+ 12x2)Var(µ), where Var(µ) :=
∫
[−2,0]
(λ+ 1)2µ(dλ). (3.4)
Proof. First note that the support of µ ensures that Qµ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0. Jensen’s
inequality yields
Qµ(x) ≤
∫
[−2,0]
(1− xλ)µ(dλ) = 1 + x.
and Q′′µ(x) ≤ 0. Since Q′µ(0) = 1, we deduce that Q′µ(x) ≤ 1 for all x ≥ 0. The next claims
follow from the fact that, for each x ≥ 0, the function
[−2, 0] 3 λ 7→ −λ/(1− xλ) is nonnegative and strictly decreasing. (3.5)
Indeed, this first implies that Q′µ(x) ≥ 0, and in fact the inequality must be strict because
µ has mean −1 and is thus not equal to δ0. In addition, (3.5) implies that
Q′′µ(x) ≥ −Qµ(x)
∫
[−2,0]
λ2
(1− xλ)2 µ(dλ) ≥ −Qµ(x)
4
(1 + 2x)2
≥ −4,
where the last step uses Qµ(x) ≤ 1 + x ≤ (1 + 2x)2. To prove the final claim, define
θ(x) :=
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− xλ µ(dλ), x ≥ 0.
Using the Harris inequality (known as Chebyshev’s sum inequality in the discrete case), we
get
−2θ(x)θ′(x) =
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− xλ µ(dλ)
∫
[−2,0]
2λ2
(1− xλ)2 µ(dλ)
≤
∫
[−2,0]
−2λ3
(1− xλ)3 µ(dλ) = θ
′′(x),
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since both integrands are decreasing functions of λ. Note that θ(0) = 1 and θ′(0) =
Var(µ) + 1, and integrate the above inequality to find θ2(x) + θ′(x) ≥ −Var(µ) for x ≥ 0.
The identity Q′′µ(x) = Qµ(x)(θ2(x) + θ′(x)) thus yields Q′′µ(x) ≥ −(1 + x)Var(µ). Integrate,
using Q′µ(0) = 1, to complete the proof. 
Using these properties, we next justify the existence, uniqueness, and stability for the
ODEs appearing in Theorems 2.5 and 2.6:
Proposition 3.2. Let µ ∈ PLap. There is a unique continuous function fµ : R+ → R+,
continuously differentiable on (0,∞), satisfying
f ′µ(t) = cQ
′
µ(fµ(t)), t > 0, fµ(0) = 0.
Moreover, we have the bounds
0 ≤ fµ(t) ≤ ct, fµ(t) ≥ ct− (12c2t2 + 16c3t3)Var(µ).
Finally, if µn is a sequence in PLap converging to µ, then Q′µn and fµn converge uniformly
to Q′µ and fµ, respectively, on compact subsets of R+.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, Q′µ is nonnegative and Lipschitz (with constant 4) on R+. A
standard Picard iteration yields existence and uniqueness of the ODE in question.
Next we prove the estimates for fµ. Note first that the bound Q
′
µ ≤ 1 from Proposition
3.1 ensures that 0 ≤ fµ(t) ≤ ct for all t ≥ 0. Use the lower bound on Q′µ from (3.4) to get
f ′µ(t) = cQ
′
µ(fµ(t)) ≥ c− c
(
fµ(t) +
1
2
fµ(t)
2
)
Var(µ) ≥ c− c(ct+ 12c2t2)Var(µ).
Integrate both sides to get the desired lower bound on fµ(t).
We next prove that Q′µn converges to Q
′
µ uniformly on compacts. Because Q
′
ν is 4-
Lipschitz and Q′ν(0) = 1 for each ν ∈ PLap, the equicontinuous family {Q′ν : ν ∈ PLap} ⊂
C(R+;R) is precompact in the topology of uniform convergence on compacts, by the Arzela`-
Ascoli theorem. Hence, we need only prove the pointwise convergence of Q′µn to Q
′
µ. But
this follows easily from the assumed convergence µn → µ and the form of Q′ in (3.3).
Finally, since Q′µn is 4-Lipschitz, for t ≥ 0 we have
|fµn(t)− fµ(t)| ≤ c
∫ t
0
|Q′µn(fµn(s))−Q′µn(fµ(s))|ds+ c
∫ t
0
|Q′µn(fµ(s))−Q′µ(fµ(s))|ds
≤ 4c
∫ t
0
|fµn(s)− fµ(s)|ds+ c sup
u∈[0,ct]
|Q′µn(u)−Q′µ(u)|.
Use Gronwall’s inequality and the uniform convergence of Q′µn to Q
′
µ on compacts to deduce
that fµn → fµ uniformly on compacts. 
This concludes the basic analysis of fµ and Qµ needed for the proofs of the main results
of Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The rest of the section is devoted to some properties of the variance
computed in Theorem 2.6, which will not be needed in the subsequent sections but which
justify the claims in Remarks 2.7 and 2.10. Extending the formula (2.11) for the variance,
we define for µ ∈ PLap and t ∈ [0, T ] the quantity
Vµ(t) := σ
2
∫ t
0
∫
[−2,0]
(
1− λfµ(T − t)
1− λfµ(T − s)
)2
µ(dλ)ds. (3.6)
20 DANIEL LACKER AND AGATHE SORET
Proposition 3.3. For each µ ∈ PLap, fµ is strictly increasing and concave, with 0 <
f ′µ(t) ≤ c for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, Vµ satisfies
Vµ(0) = 0, V
′
µ(0) = σ
2, and V ′′µ (0) = −2σ2
(f ′µ(T ))2
cQµ(fµ(T ))
.
Proof. Fix µ ∈ PLap. First, we note that
f ′µ(t) = cQ
′
µ(fµ(t)), and f
′′
µ(t) = cQ
′′
µ(fµ(t))f
′
µ(t).
Using Proposition 3.1 we deduce that 0 < f ′µ(t) ≤ c and f ′′µ(t) ≤ 0 for all t ≥ 0, which
proves the first claim. Differentiating in (3.6) using Liebniz’s rule yields
V ′µ(t) = σ
2 − 2σ2f ′µ(T − t)
∫ t
0
∫
[−2,0]
−λ(1− λfµ(T − t))
(1− λfµ(T − s))2 µ(dλ)ds.
The claim V ′µ(0) = σ2 follows. Differentiate again at t = 0 to get
V ′′µ (0) = −2σ2f ′µ(T )
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− λfµ(T )µ(dλ)
= −2σ2 d
dt
∣∣∣
t=T
∫
[−2,0]
log(1− λfµ(t))µ(dλ)
= −2σ2 d
dt
∣∣∣
t=T
logQµ(fµ(t))
= −2σ2Q
′
µ(fµ(T ))f
′
µ(T )
Qµ(fµ(T ))
= −2σ2 (f
′
µ(T ))
2
cQµ(fµ(T ))
.

We next show that the dense graph regime uniquely minimizes the variance, as an-
nounced in Remark 2.10.
Proposition 3.4. Let µ ∈ PLap. For each t ∈ (0, T ] we have
Vµ(t) ≥ σ2t1 + c(T − t)
1 + cT
= Vδ−1(t),
with equality if and only if µ = δ−1.
Proof. Note from Proposition 3.1 that Qµ(x) ≤ 1 + x = Qδ−1(x) and Q′µ(x) ≤ 1 = Q′δ−1(x)
for x ≥ 0. By a standard comparison argument, it follows that fµ(t) ≤ fδ−1(t) = ct for all
t ≥ 0. Next, note that
R+ 3 t 7→ 1− λfµ(t)
1− λfδ−1(t)
=
1− λfµ(t)
1− λct is non-increasing for each λ ∈ [−2, 0]. (3.7)
Indeed, the derivative is
−λf ′µ(t)(1− λct) + λc(1− λfµ(t))
(1− λct)2 =
−λ(f ′µ(t)− c) + cλ2(tf ′µ(t)− fµ(t))
(1− λct)2 .
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This is at most zero, because we know f ′µ(t) ≤ c by Proposition 3.3, and the concavity of
fµ together with fµ(0) = 0 imply tf
′
µ(t) ≤ fµ(t). This proves (3.7), which is equivalent to
the fact that
1− λfµ(T − t)
1− λfµ(T − s) ≥
1− λfδ−1(T − t)
1− λfδ−1(T − s)
=
1− λc(T − t)
1− λc(T − s) , for t > s > 0.
As both sides are non-negative, this implies∫
[−2,0]
(
1− λfµ(T − t)
1− λfµ(T − s)
)2
µ(dλ) ≥
∫
[−2,0]
(
1− λc(T − t)
1− λc(T − s)
)2
µ(dλ). (3.8)
Finally, the function
[−2, 0] 3 λ 7→
(
1− λc(T − t)
1− λc(T − s)
)2
is strictly convex for t > s > 0, which by Jensen’s inequality implies∫
[−2,0]
(
1− λc(T − t)
1− λc(T − s)
)2
µ(dλ) ≥
(
1 + c(T − t)
1 + c(T − s)
)2
(3.9)
since µ has mean −1. Combine (3.8) and (3.9) with the definition of Vµ to get Vµ(t) ≥
Vδ−1(t), as desired. The inequality (3.9) is strict unless µ = δ−1. 
4. The equilibrium on finite graphs: Proof of Theorem 2.5
This section gives the proof of Theorem 2.5. We begin with some general symmetry
considerations in Section 4.1. We then derive the HJB system in Section 4.2 and reduce
it to a system of Riccati equations in Section 4.3; these two steps are standard for linear-
quadratic games. The explicit resolution of the system of Riccati equations is where the
difficulty lies. In Section 4.4 we show that the proposed solution Theorem 2.5 does indeed
work, and the remaining sections 4.5 and 4.6 provide the remaining computations of the
equilibrium state process dynamics and the average value of the game.
The proof given in this section, while complete and rigorous, is opaque in the sense that
it does not give any idea of how one might arrive at the solution of the system of Riccati
equations. For this reason, we give in Section 5 a sketch a direct derivation of the solution.
We fix throughout the section a finite transitive graph G = (V,E), and write V =
{1, . . . , n} for some n ∈ N. We may assume without loss of generality that G is connected
(see Remark 2.1). Throughout this entire section, we omit G from the notation by writing,
e.g., L = LG and X = X
G.
4.1. Symmetries. We first discuss some basic symmetry properties. Since the graph G is
transitive and thus regular, the Laplacian matrix is symmetric, i.e., L = L>.
We will make some use of the so-called regular representation of the automorphism
group. Recall from the beginning of Section 2.2 that Aut(G) denotes the set of automor-
phisms of G. To each ϕ ∈ Aut(G) we associate an invertible n × n matrix Rϕ, defined by
requiring Rϕei = eϕ(i) for each i ∈ V , where we recall that (e1, ..., en) denotes the standard
Euclidean basis in Rn. It is clear that RϕRψ = Rϕ◦ψ, and in particular R−1ϕ = Rϕ−1 . We
also have R>ϕ = Rϕ−1 , because
e>i Rϕej = e
>
i eϕ(j) = 1{i=ϕ(j)} = 1{j=ϕ−1(i)} = e
>
j Rϕ−1ei.
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The following elementary lemma summarizes some uses of transitivity (Definition 2.3). The
third property will be used only in the alternative proof of Theorem 2.5 given in Section 5.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that G = (V,E) is transitive, with V = {1, . . . , n}.
(i) L commutes with Rϕ for each ϕ ∈ Aut(G).
(ii) If Y ∈ Rn×n commutes with Rϕ for every ϕ ∈ Aut(G), then
Yii =
1
n
Tr(Y ), ∀ i ∈ V.
(iii) If Y 1, . . . , Y n ∈ Rn×n satisfy RϕY i = Y ϕ(i)Rϕ for every ϕ ∈ Aut(G) and i ∈ V , then
Y iii = Y
j
jj , ∀ i, j ∈ V.
Proof.
(i) For ϕ ∈ Aut(G) we compute
e>i R
>
ϕLRϕej = e
>
ϕ(i)Leϕ(j) = e
>
i Lej , ∀i, j ∈ V,
with the last equality using the fact that ϕ is an automorphism. This shows that
R>ϕLRϕ = L. Since R>ϕ = R−1ϕ , this shows LRϕ = RϕL.
(ii) It suffices to apply (iii) with Y 1 = · · · = Y n = Y to get Yii = Yjj for all i, j ∈ V .
(iii) Let i, j ∈ V . By transitivity, there exists ϕ ∈ Aut(G) such that ϕ(i) = j. Then
e>i Y
iei = e
>
i R
T
ϕY
ϕ(i)Rϕei = e
>
ϕ(i)Y
ϕ(i)eϕ(i) = e
>
j Y
jej .

4.2. The corresponding system of HJB equations. We can write the cost function of
(2.2) for player i ∈ V as
Ji(α1, . . . , αn) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|αi(t,X(t))|2dt+ c
∣∣∣e>i LX(T )∣∣∣2] .
A standard argument associates this n-player game to the following system of n coupled
PDEs:
0 = ∂tvi(t,x)− 1
2
(∂ivi(t,x))
2 −
∑
k 6=i
∂kvk(t,x)∂kvi(t,x) +
σ2
2
n∑
k=1
∂kkvi(t,x),
vi(T,x) =
1
2
c(e>i Lx)
2, i = 1, . . . , n.
(4.1)
Here, we write x = (x1, . . . , xn) for a typical vector in Rn, and for the functions vi :
[0, T ]×Rn → R we write ∂t and ∂k for the derivative with respect to t and xk, respectively.
If (v1, . . . , vn) is a classical solution of (4.1), then the controls
αi(t,x) = −∂ivi(t,x), i = 1, . . . , n, (4.2)
form a Markovian Nash equilibrium.
For a thorough derivation of PDEs of this form and a verification theorem, we refer to
[9, Section I.2.1.4]. But let us briefly explain how to check if some (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ AnG forms
a Nash equilibrium. Considering player i’s optimization problem,
inf
αi∈AG
Ji(α1, . . . , αi−1, αi, αi+1, . . . , αn). (4.3)
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Standard stochastic control theory (see, e.g., [18, 37]) leads to the HJB equation
0 = ∂tvi(t,x)− 1
2
(∂ivi(t,x))
2 +
∑
k 6=i
αk(t,x)∂kvi(t,x) +
σ2
2
n∑
k=1
∂kkvi(t,x),
vi(T,x) =
1
2
c(e>i Lx)
2.
(4.4)
Indeed, the (reduced) Hamiltonian for player i is
Hi(x,p) = inf
a∈R
1
2
a2 + api +
∑
k 6=i
αk(t,x)pk
 = −1
2
p2i +
∑
k 6=i
αk(t,x)pk, x,p ∈ Rn,
with the infimum attained at a = −pi. Hence, after solving the PDE (4.4), the optimal
control in (4.3) is given by αi(t,x) = −∂ivi(t,x). Applying this optimality criterion for
each player i = 1, . . . , n couples the PDEs (4.4), leading to the system (4.1).
4.3. Reduction to Riccati equations. Linear-quadratic control problems and games
always relate to Riccati-type equations after a quadratic ansatz. For our PDE system (4.1),
we make the ansatz
vi(t,x) =
1
2
x>F i(t)x+ hi(t), (t,x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (4.5)
where F i : [0, T ] → Rn×n and hi : [0, T ] → R are functions to be determined. We assume
without loss of generality that F i(t) is symmetric for each t. Recall that L = L>, and note
that the boundary condition vi(T,x) =
1
2c(e
>
i Lx)
2 = 12cx
>Leie>i Lx leads to the boundary
conditions
F i(T ) = cLeie
>
i L, hi(T ) = 0. (4.6)
We write F˙ i and h˙i for the derivatives of these functions. Once we check that this ansatz
is correct, the equilibrium controls are given by
αi(t,x) = −∂ivi(t,x) = −e>i F i(t)x, i = 1, . . . , n. (4.7)
Applying the ansatz (4.5) to the PDE system (4.1), noting that ∂kvi(t,x) = e
>
k F
i(t)x
and ∂kkvi(t,x) = e
>
k F
i(t)ek, leads to
1
2
x>F˙ i(t)x+ h˙i(t) +
1
2
(e>i F
i(t)x)2 −
n∑
k=1
(
e>k F
k(t)x
)(
e>k F
i(t)x
)
+
σ2
2
Tr(F i(t)) = 0.
Collecting like terms, we find
x>
(1
2
F˙ i(t)−
n∑
k=1
F k(t)eke
>
k F
i(t) +
1
2
F i(t)eie
>
i F
i(t)
)
x+ h˙i(t) +
σ2
2
Tr(F i(t)) = 0.
This must hold for each x ∈ Rn, and we note that a square matrix A satisfies x>Ax = 0 if
any only if A+A> = 0. Recalling that F i(t) is symmetric, we arrive at the two equations:
0 = F˙ i(t)−
n∑
j=1
F j(t)eje
>
j F
i(t)− F i(t)
n∑
j=1
eje
>
j F
j(t) + F i(t)eie
>
i F
i(t), (4.8)
0 = h˙i(t) +
σ2
2
Tr(F i(t)), i = 1, . . . , n.
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Once we solve for F i using the first equation, the second equation and the boundary con-
dition hi(T ) = 0 yield
hi(t) =
σ2
2
∫ T
t
Tr(F i(s))ds. (4.9)
Hence, the main task ahead is to solve the system (4.8). A key role will be played by the
matrix
P (t) =
n∑
j=1
F j(t)eje
>
j ,
which in equilibrium will agree with PG(t) defined in (2.5).
4.4. Checking the solution. It follows from the results of Section 3 that the ODE
f ′(t) = cQ′(f(t)), f(0) = 0,
is well-posed, where Q(x) = QG(x) = (det(I − xL))1/n, and the solution f is nonnegative
and strictly increasing since Q′ > 0. As a result, the matrix-valued function defined in (2.5)
by
P (t) = PG(t) := −f ′(T − t)L
(
I − f(T − t)L)−1 (4.10)
is well-defined; the symmetric matrix I − f(T − t)L is invertible because L is negative
semidefinite and f ≥ 0. Moreover, P (t) satisfies the following useful properties for each
t ∈ [0, T ]:
(i) eTi P (t)ei =
1
nTr(P (t)) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) P (t) is symmetric and positive semidefinite. Both L and P (t) have 0 as an eigenvalue,
with the same multiplicity.
(iii) P (t) and L commute.
Indeed, the third property is trivial. The second follows from the facts that L is negative
semidefinite, f ≥ 0, and f ′ > 0; note that the vector of all ones is an eigenvector of L with
eigenvalue zero, and thus also an eigenvector of P (t) with eigenvalue zero. To derive the
first property, note that L commutes with Rϕ for all ϕ ∈ Aut(G) by Lemma 4.1(i), and thus
so does P (t), which means Lemma 4.1(ii) applies. The strict positivity of Tr(P (t)) follows
from the fact that P (t) is positive semidefinite and is not the zero matrix.
Since Tr(P (t)) > 0 by property (i), we may define F i for i = 1, . . . , n by
F i(t) :=
1
Tr(P (t))/n
P (t)eie
>
i P (t). (4.11)
Using property (i), we compute
e>i F
i(t) =
1
Tr(P (t))/n
(
e>i P (t)ei
)
e>i P (t) = e
>
i P (t).
In other words, the ith column of F i(t) is the same as that of P (t). In particular, the control
α∗i (t,x) = −e>i P (t)x defined in Theorem 2.5 satisfies α∗i (t,x) = −e>i F i(t)x. Recall from
(4.7) that this was indeed the form dictated by the PDE.
We next check that (F 1, . . . , Fn) solve the equations (4.8) and boundary conditions
(4.6). Beginning with the boundary condition (4.6), note first that f(0) = 0 and thus
P (T ) = −f ′(0)L = −cQ′(0)L = −cL.
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This implies Tr(P (T ))n = c, and from which we immediately compute F
i(T ) = cLeie
>
i L, as
desired. We next turn to the equations (4.8). Using property (i) once again, we compute
n∑
i=1
F i(t)eie
>
i =
1
Tr(P (t))/n
n∑
i=1
P (t)ei
(
e>i P (t)ei
)
e>i = P (t)
n∑
i=1
eie
>
i = P (t).
Similarly,
F i(t)eie
>
i F
i(t) = P (t)eie
>
i P (t).
With these identifications, to show that (F 1, . . . , Fn) solves (4.8), it suffices to check that
F˙ i(t)− P (t)F i(t)− F i(t)P (t) + P (t)eieTi P (t) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ). (4.12)
For this purpose, let us define τ(t) := Tr(P (t))/n > 0. Omitting the time-dependence, the
equation (4.12) then becomes
− τ
′
τ2
Peie
>
i P +
1
τ
P˙ eie
>
i P +
1
τ
Peie
>
i P˙ −
1
τ
P 2eie
>
i P −
1
τ
Peie
>
i P
2 + Peie
>
i P = 0,
or equivalently, multiplying by τ ,
− τ
′
τ
Peie
>
i P + P˙ eie
>
i P + Peie
>
i P˙ − P 2eie>i P − Peie>i P 2 + τPeie>i P = 0. (4.13)
Hence (F 1, ..., Fn) are solutions of the ODEs (4.12) if and only if P solves the ODEs (4.13)
for i = 1, . . . , n, with τ(t) = Tr(P (t))/n.
Now let v1, . . . , vn denote an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors of the symmetric matrix
L, with associated eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λn. From the definition (4.10) of P (t) it follows that
v1, . . . , vn are eigenvectors of P (t), and the eigenvalue ρj(t) of P (t) associated with the
eigenvector vj is given by
ρj(t) =
−f ′(T − t)λj
1− f(T − t)λj = −∂t log(1− f(T − t)λj). (4.14)
Note that because P (t) is symmetric, we have not only P (t)vk = ρk(t)vk but also v
>
k P (t) =
ρk(t)v
>
k for all k. Now, P (t) satisfies (4.13) for all i = 1, ..., n if and only if for all i, j, k we
have
v>j
(
−τ
′
τ
Peie
>
i P + P˙ eie
>
i P + Peie
>
i P˙ − P 2eie>i P − Peie>i P 2 + τPeie>i P
)
vk = 0,
which is equivalent to
(v>j ei)(e
>
i vk)
(
−τ
′
τ
ρjρk + ρ
′
jρk + ρjρ
′
k − ρ2jρk − ρjρ2k + τρjρk
)
= 0,
where we omit the time-dependence from ρk = ρk(t). Notice that the term in the parenthesis
can be written as(
ρ′k − ρ2k −
ρk
2
(
τ ′
τ
− τ
))
ρj +
(
ρ′j − ρ2j −
ρj
2
(
τ ′
τ
− τ
))
ρk.
To complete the proof, it thus suffices to show that
ρ′k − ρ2k −
ρk
2
(
τ ′
τ
− τ
)
= 0.
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For k such that Lvk = 0, this holds trivially because ρk ≡ 0; for all other k we have ρk(t) > 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ], and by dividing by ρk, we may show instead that
ρ′k
ρk
− ρk = 1
2
(
τ ′
τ
− τ
)
, for k such that ρk(t) > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (4.15)
where τ := 1nTr(P ) =
1
n
∑n
k=1 ρk.
Now, using the form of ρk from (4.14), a straightforward computation yields
ρ′k(t)
ρk(t)
− ρk(t) = −f
′′(T − t)
f ′(T − t) . (4.16)
To simplify the right-hand side of (4.15), we recall Q(x) := (det(I − xL))1/n = ∏nk=1(1 −
xλk)
1/n and compute
τ(t) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
ρk(t) = − 1
n
n∑
k=1
∂t log(1− f(T − t)λk)
= −∂t log
n∏
k=1
(1− f(T − t)λk)1/n,
= − ∂
∂t
logQ(f(T − t)) = f
′(T − t)Q′(f(T − t))
Q(f(T − t)) .
Therefore after computing the derivative of τ and rearranging we obtain
τ ′(t)
τ(t)
− τ(t) = −f
′′(T − t)
f ′(T − t) −
f ′(T − t)Q′′(f(T − t))
Q′(f(T − t)) . (4.17)
Now, since f solves the ODE f ′(t) = cQ′(f(t)), we have also f ′′(t) = cQ′′(f(t))f ′(t), and
we compute
f ′(T − t)Q′′(f(T − t))
Q′(f(T − t)) = cQ
′′(f(T − t)) = f
′′(T − t)
f ′(T − t) .
Returning to (4.17), we deduce
τ ′(t)
τ(t)
− τ(t) = −2f
′′(T − t)
f ′(T − t) .
Recalling (4.16), this proves (4.15), which completes the proof that (F 1, . . . , Fn) defined in
(4.11) solves the desired equations. Thus, the controls α∗i (t,x) = −e>i P (t)x form a Nash
equilibrium as discussed above.
4.5. State process dynamics in equilibrium. The state process in equilibrium is
dXi(t) = −eTi P (t)X(t)dt+ σdWi(t), i = 1, . . . , n,
which can be written in vector form as
dX(t) = −P (t)X(t)dt+ σdW (t).
We can explicitly solve this SDE in terms of P , noting that P (t) and P (s) commute for all
t, s ∈ [0, T ], to obtain
X(t) = e−
∫ t
0 P (s)dsX(0) + σ
∫ t
0
e−
∫ t
s P (u)dudW (s).
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Thus we deduce that in equilibrium the law of X(t) is
X(t) ∼ N
(
e−
∫ t
0 P (s)dsX(0), σ2
∫ t
0
e−2
∫ t
s P (u)duds
)
.
Using the expression P (t) = −∂t log(I − f(T − t)L), noting that the log of the positive
definite matrix is well-defined via power series, we have
exp
(
−
∫ t
s
P (u)du
)
= (I − f(T − t)L)(I − f(T − s)L)−1.
Hence, X(t) has mean vector
E[X(t)] = (I − f(T − t)L)(I − f(T )L)−1X(0)
and covariance matrix
Var(X(t)) = σ2(I − f(T − t)L)2
∫ t
0
(I − f(T − s)L)−2ds.
4.6. Computing the value of the game. We next justify (2.6). Returning to the ansatz
(4.5) and (4.9), and recalling the form of F i from (4.11), we find
1
n
n∑
i=1
vk(t,x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1
2
x>F i(t)x+ hi(t)
)
(4.18)
=
1
2Tr(P (t))
n∑
i=1
(e>i P (t)x)
2 +
σ2
2n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
Tr(F i(s))ds. (4.19)
To compute the second term, we define R(x) = log 1n
∑n
k=1
−λk
1−xλk for x ≥ 0, so that
1
n
n∑
i=1
Tr(F i(t)) =
1
n
n∑
i,k=1
e>k F
i(t)ek =
1
Tr(P (t))
n∑
i,k=1
e>k P (t)eie
>
i P (t)ek
=
1
Tr(P (s))
n∑
k=1
e>k P (t)
2ek
=
Tr(P (t)2)
Tr(P (t))
= −
n∑
k=1
(f ′(T − t))2λ2k
(1− f(T − t)λk)2
/
n∑
k=1
f ′(T − t)λk
1− f(T − t)λk
= −R′(f(T − t))f ′(T − t)
= ∂tR(f(T − t)).
Thus, using f(0) = 0 and R(0) = 0, we get
σ2
2n
n∑
i=1
∫ T
t
Tr(F i(s))ds =
σ2
2
[R(f(0))−R(f(T − t))] = −σ
2
2
R(f(T − t)).
Finally, note that
R(f(T − t)) = log 1
n
n∑
k=1
−λk
1− f(T − t)λk = log
Tr(P (t))
nf ′(T − t) .
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Returning to (4.19), we get
1
n
n∑
i=1
vk(t,x) =
|P (t)x|2
2Tr(P (t))
− σ
2
2
log
Tr(P (t))
nf ′(T − t) .
Plugging in t = 0 and x = XG(0), the left-hand side equals Val(G), and the proof of (2.6)
is complete.
5. A direct but heuristic proof of Theorem 2.5
In this section we aim to give a more enlightening derivation of the solution given in
Theorem 2.5, compared to the more concise “guess and check” style of proof presented in
Section 4. To keep this brief, we will avoid giving full details and instead treat this section
as a heuristic argument. Suppose throughout this section that G is a given finite transitive
graph with vertex set V = {1, . . . , n}, and omit G from the notations as in L = LG.
5.1. More on symmetries. As a first step, we elaborate on the symmetry discussion of
Section 4.1. Recall the notation Aut(G) and Rϕ introduced therein, and note that Aut(G)
acts naturally on RV via (ϕ,x) 7→ Rϕx.
Suppose we have a solution (v1, . . . , vn) of the HJB system (4.1). The structure of the
game described in Section 2.1 is invariant under automorphisms of G. More precisely, this
should translate into the following symmetry property for the value functions:
vi(t,x) = vϕ(i)(t, Rϕx), i ∈ V, ϕ ∈ Aut(G), x ∈ RV . (5.1)
In particular, if (vi(t,x))i∈V solves the HJB system (4.1), then a straightforward calculation
shows that so does (vϕ(i)(t, Rϕx))i∈V . Hence, if uniqueness holds for (4.1), then we would
deduce (5.1). Plugging the quadratic ansatz (4.5) into both sides of (5.1) yields
x>F i(t)x+ hi(t) = x>R>ϕF
ϕ(i)(t)Rϕx+ hϕ(i)(t), i ∈ V, ϕ ∈ Aut(G), x ∈ RV .
Matching coefficients yields
F i(t) = R>ϕF
ϕ(i)(t)Rϕ, hi(t) = hϕ(i)(t), i ∈ V, ϕ ∈ Aut(G). (5.2)
This immediately shows that the map i 7→ hi(t) is constant on orbits of the action of
Aut(G) on V . That is, if i ∈ V and
Orbit(i) := {ϕ(i) : ϕ ∈ Aut(G)},
then hk(t) = hj(t) for all k, j ∈ Orbit(i). Note that the orbits {Orbit(i) : i ∈ V } form a
partition V , and the assumption that G is transitive (Definition 2.3) means precisely that V
itself is the only orbit. Similarly, elaborating on the first identity in (5.2), for any i, j, k ∈ V
we find
e>k F
i(t)ej = e
>
k R
>
ϕF
ϕ(i)(t)Rϕej = e
>
ϕ(k)F
ϕ(i)(t)eϕ(j). (5.3)
In the Riccati equation (4.8), a key role was played by the matrix P (t) :=
∑n
j=1 F
j(t)eje
>
j .
Under a stronger transitivity assumption on the graph, the symmetry property (5.2) is
enough to ensure that P (t) is symmetric and commutes with L for each t:
Definition 5.1. We say that a graph G is generously transitive if for each i, j ∈ V there
exists ϕ ∈ Aut(G) such that ϕ(i) = j and ϕ(j) = i.
Proposition 5.2. If G is generously transitive and (5.2) holds, then for each t ∈ [0, T ] the
matrix P (t) :=
∑n
j=1 F
j(t)eje
>
j satisfies:
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(i) P (t) = P (t)>.
(ii) P (t) and L commute.
Proof. For brevity, we write F k = F k(t) and P = P (t). Note that Pek = F
kek for each
k = 1, . . . , n. Let j, k ∈ V , and let ϕ ∈ Aut(G) be such that ϕ(j) = k and ϕ(k) = j.
(i) We find from (5.3) that
e>j Pek = e
>
j F
kek = e
>
ϕ(j)F
ϕ(k)eϕ(k) = e
>
k F
jej = e
>
k Pej .
(ii) Using the identities ej = Rϕek and ek = Rϕej , then the fact that L commutes with
R>ϕ , and finally that R>ϕF kRϕ = R>ϕFϕ(j)Rϕ = F j we get
e>j LPek = e
>
j LF
kek = e
>
k R
>
ϕLF
kRϕej = e
>
k LR
>
ϕF
kRϕej = e
>
k LF
jej = e
>
k LPej .

In our “guess and check” proof of Theorem 2.5 given in Section 4, the two properties
of Proposition 5.2 followed automatically from the asserted formula (2.5) for P (t). Here we
see, on the other hand, that these properties follow from purely algebraic arguments.
5.2. Heuristic solution of the HJB system. In this section we will explain how to find
the expressions of P and F i. We start here from the Riccati equation (4.8), and assume
from now on that the graph G is generously transitive. The objective is to find F 1, . . . , Fn
such that each F i is a solution of the matrix differential equation
F˙ i − PF i − F iP> + F ieie>i F i = 0, (5.4)
with terminal condition F i(T ) = cLeie
>
i L, and with P =
∑n
i=1 F
ieie
>
i . We use a fixed
point approach: Treating P as given, this is a system of n decoupled Ricatti differential
equations which we can solve. The solutions F 1, ..., Fn give rise to a new P , which we then
match to the original P .
Now fix P , which by Proposition 5.2 we can assume to be symmetric and commuting
with L, and let us solve for F 1, . . . , Fn. From [38], we know that if (Y i,Λi) is solution of
the equation [
Y˙ i
Λ˙i
]
=
[
P 0
eie
>
i −P
] [
Y i
Λi
]
.
on [0, T ] with Λi nonsingular on [0, T ] then F i = Y i(Λi)−1 is a solution of (5.4).
Since P (t) is symmetric and commutes with L, the two matrices are simultaneously
diagonalizable. If we further assume that P (t) and P (s) commute for all s and t, then the
matrices L and {P (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} are all simultaneously diagonalizable. We can then choose
an orthonormal basis V = (v1, . . . , vn) of eigenvectors of P (t) and L, such that L and P (t)
are diagonalizable in this basis for all t ∈ [0, T ]. For each t, let ρ1(t), . . . , ρn(t) denote the
eigenvalues of P (t) with corresponding eigenvectors v1, . . . , vn.
We can now easily solve the equation for Y i to get
Y i(t) = P˜ (t)Y i(T ), where P˜ (t) := exp
(
−
∫ T
t
P (s)ds
)
.
We deduce from the expression of Y i that Λi solves the equation Λ˙i(t) = eie
>
i P˜ (t)Y
i(T )−
P (t)Λi(t), and it follows that
Λi(t) = P˜−1(t)
[
Λi(T )−
∫ T
t
P˜ (s)eie
>
i P˜ (s)Y
i(T )ds
]
.
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If we now choose the boundary values
Λi(T ) = I, Y i(T ) = cLeie
>
i L,
then F i = Y i(Λi)−1 is symmetric and the terminal condition is satisfied. Plugging these
terminal conditions into Λi and Y i yields
Λi(t) = P˜−1(t)
[
I − c
∫ T
t
Tr(P˜ (s)L)
n
P˜ (s)eie
>
i Lds
]
, Y i(t) = cP˜ (t)Leie
>
i L.
Here we used the identity e>i P˜ (s)Lei =
Tr(P˜L)
n which holds by Lemma 4.1(ii), since P˜L
commutes with Rϕ for all ϕ ∈ Aut(G).
Now that we have our explicit solutions (Y i,Λi), assuming that Λi(t) is invertible, we
deduce that the Ricatti equation (5.4) admits the following solution
F i(t) = cP˜ (t)Leie
>
i L
[
I − cΞi(t)]−1 P˜ (t), (5.5)
where we define
Ξi(t) :=
∫ T
t
Tr(P˜ (s)L)
n
P˜ (s)eie
>
i Lds.
The objective is now to solve for P . To that end, we first note that
F i(t)ei = cηi(t)P˜ (t)Lei, where ηi(t) := e
>
i L[I − cΞi(t)]−1P˜ (t)ei. (5.6)
Recalling that both L and P˜ commute with Rϕ, a simple computation shows that RϕΞ
i(t) =
Ξϕ(i)(t)Rϕ for ϕ ∈ Aut(G). It follows thatRϕL[I−cΞi(t)]−1P˜ (t) = L[I−cΞϕ(i)(t)]−1P˜ (t)Rϕ,
and using Lemma 4.1(iii) we deduce that η1(t) = η2(t) = · · · = ηn(t), and we let η(t) denote
the common value. We then compute
P (t) =
n∑
i=1
F i(t)eie
>
i = c
n∑
i=1
η(t)P˜ (t)Leie
>
i = cη(t)P˜ (t)L. (5.7)
Because P , P˜ , and L are simultaneously diagonalizable, we deduce the following relationship
between the eigenvalues:
ρk(t)e
∫ T
t ρk(s)ds = cη(t)λk, k = 1, . . . , n,
where λ1, . . . , λn are the eigenvalues of L, corresponding to eigenvectors v1, . . . , vn. Inte-
grating from t to T , taking the logarithm, and finally differentiating leads to
ρk(t) =
cλkη(t)
1 + cλk
∫ T
t η(s)ds
, (5.8)
which we can rewrite in matrix form as
P (t) = cη(t)L
(
I + c
∫ T
t
η(s)dsL
)−1
. (5.9)
This completes our fixed point argument, provided we identify η.
Using once more that e>i LP˜ (s)ei =
Tr(P˜ (s)L)
n for all s, a quick computation shows
(Ξi(t))2 =
( ∫ T
t
(Tr(P˜ (s)L)
n
)2
ds
)
Ξi(t). Thus, assuming the validity of the power series (I −
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cΞi(t))−1 =
∑∞
k=0(cΞ
i(t))k, we have
[I − cΞi(t)]−1 =
∞∑
k=0
(cΞi(t))k = I + c
[
1− c
∫ T
t
(Tr(P˜ (s)L)
n
)2
ds
]−1
Ξi(t). (5.10)
Plugging this back into the definition (5.6) of η, we get (for any i)
η(t) = e>i L[I − cΞi(t)]−1P˜ (t)ei =
Tr(P˜ (t)L)
n
1
1− c ∫ Tt (Tr(P˜ (s)L)n )2 ds. (5.11)
Using (5.7) and (5.8) we get Tr(P˜ (t)L) = 1cη(t)Tr(P (t)) =
∑n
k=1
λk
1+cλk
∫ T
t η(s)ds
, and from
(5.11) we then obtain
η(t) =
1
n
∑n
k=1
λk
1+cλk
∫ T
t η(s)ds
1− c ∫ Tt ( 1n∑nk=1 λk1+cλk ∫ Ts η(s)ds
)2
ds
. (5.12)
Multiplying both sides by 1n
∑n
k=1
λk
1+cλk
∫ T
t η(s)ds
, integrating from t to T , and exponentiating
yield
n∏
k=1
(
1 + cλk
∫ T
t
η(s)ds
)1/n
=
1
1− c ∫ Tt ( 1n∑nk=1 λk1+cλk ∫ Ts η(s)ds
)2
ds
. (5.13)
Defining Q(x) = (det(I−xL))1/n and f(t) = −c ∫ TT−t µ(s)ds, we find from (5.12) and (5.13)
that f must satisfy f(0) = 0 and f ′(t) = cQ′(f(t)). Returning to (5.9), and noting that
f ′(T − t) = −η(t), we have thus proved that P can be written as
P (t) = −f ′(T − t)L (I − f(T − t)L)−1 ,
justifying the expression of P in Theorem 2.5.
We can also simplify the expression of F i in (5.5) to recover the expression we introduced
in (4.11) our first the proof of Theorem 2.5. Use (5.10) to get
F i(t) =
c
1− c ∫ Tt (Tr(P˜ (s)L)n )2 dsP˜ (t)Leie
>
i LP˜ (t).
From (5.7) and (5.11), we deduce 1− c ∫ Tt (Tr(P˜ (s)L)n )2 ds = 1cµ(t)2 Tr(P (t))n and
F i(t) =
1
Tr(P (t))/n
P (t)eie
>
i P (t).
6. Correlation decay: Proof of Proposition 2.12
The purpose of this section is to prove Proposition 2.12, which is essential in the proof
of the convergence of the empirical measure given in the next section.
Throughout this section, we fix a finite transitive graph G = (V,E) without isolated
vertices and with vertex set V = {1, ..., n} for some n ∈ N. We may without loss of
generality assume G to be connected, as otherwise XGv (t) and X
G
u (t) are independent for u
and v in distinct connected components and the right-hand side of (2.17) is zero. Since G
is fixed throughout the section we omit it in the notations, e.g., L = LG, X(t) = X
G(t),
32 DANIEL LACKER AND AGATHE SORET
δ = δ(G), and f = fG. As before, (e1, ..., en) denotes the standard Euclidean basis in Rn.
We make some use of the adjacency matrix A = AG in this section, and we repeatedly use
the well known fact that e>uA`ev counts the number of paths of length ` from v to u, for
each ` ∈ N and vertices v, u ∈ V .
Recall from (2.7) that Xi(t) is Gaussian with variance
σ2
n
n∑
k=1
∫ t
0
(
1− f(T − t)λk
1− f(T − s)λk
)2
ds ≤ σ2T.
Indeed, the inequality follows from the fact that −2 ≤ λk ≤ 0 and f is increasing. Since
0 < γ < 1, this proves the claim (2.17) in the case u = v (noting also that δ(G) ≥ 1). We
thus focus henceforth on the case of distinct vertices.
From Theorem 2.5, we know that in equilibrium the state process X is normally dis-
tributed with covariance matrix
σ2(I − f(T − t)L)2
∫ t
0
(I − f(T − s)L)−2ds.
Our objective is to find a bound for the off-diagonal elements of this matrix. Fix two distinct
vertices u, v ∈ V . We have
Cov(Xu(t), Xv(t)) = σ
2
∫ t
0
n∑
k=1
e>u (I − f(T − t)L)2eke>k (I − f(T − s)L)−2evds. (6.1)
Let us first develop e>u (I − f(T − t)L)2ek. Using L = 1δA − I, where A is the adjacency
matrix of the graph, we find
e>u (I − f(T − t)L)2ek = (1 + f(T − t))2
(
e>u ek − 2
f(T − t)
δ(1 + f(T − t))e
>
uAek
+
(
f(T − t)
δ(1 + f(T − t))
)2
e>uA
2ek
)
.
Recall that d(i, j) = dG(i, j) denotes the distance between two vertices i and j in the graph,
i.e., the length of the shortest path from i to j in G. Let us write P (i,m) the set of vertices
which can be reached in exactly m steps from i. By definition of A, e>uAek = 1 if d(u, k) = 1
and zero otherwise. Similarly, e>uA2ek is the number of paths of length 2 from u to k, so,
in particular, e>uA2ek = 0 unless k ∈ P (u, 2). Plugging this into (6.1), we get
Cov(Xu(t), Xv(t)) = σ
2(1 + f(T − t))2
∫ t
0
{
e>u (I − f(T − s)L)−2ev
−
∑
k∈P (u,1)
2
f(T − t)
δ(1 + f(T − t))e
T
k (I − f(T − s)L)−2ev (6.2)
+
∑
k∈P (u,2)
(
f(T − t)
δ(1 + f(T − t))
)2
e>uA
2eke
T
k (I − f(T − s)L)−2ev
}
ds.
Next, we estimate the term
eTk (I − f(T − s)L)−2ev = (1 + f(T − s))−2eTk
(
I − f(T − s)
δ(1 + f(T − s))A
)−2
ev.
STOCHASTIC GAMES ON LARGE GRAPHS 33
To simplify the notations, we define the function
γ(s) :=
f(T − s)
1 + f(T − s) .
From Proposition 3.2, we know that 0 ≤ f(t) ≤ ct for all t ∈ [0, T ], and thus 0 ≤ γ(s) < 1
for all s ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, the spectral radius of the adjacency matrix A is always bounded
by the degree δ. We can thus use the series 1
(1−x)2 =
∑∞
`=0(`+ 1)x
` for |x| < 1 to get
e>k (I − f(T − s)L)−2ev = (1 + f(T − s))−2
∞∑
`=0
(`+ 1)
(
γ(s)
δ
)`
e>k A
`ev
= (1 + f(T − s))−2
∞∑
`=d(k,v)
(`+ 1)
(
γ(s)
δ
)`
e>k A
`ev,
(6.3)
where in the last line we used the fact that eTkA
`ev = 0 if ` < d(k, v), since the latter
implies there are no paths of length ` from k to v. Next, note the elementary bound
0 ≤ eTkA`ev ≤ δ`−1, since each vertex has exactly δ neighbors. Indeed, for each of the first
`− 1 steps of a path of length ` from k to v, there are at most δ choices of vertex, and for
the last step there is at most one choice which terminates the path at v. Hence, using the
identity
∞∑
`=k
(`+ 1)x` =
d
dx
( ∞∑
`=k
x`+1
)
=
d
dx
(
xk+1
1− x
)
=
xk
(1− x)2 (1 + k(1− x))
for |x| < 1, we deduce from (6.3) that
0 ≤ e>k (I − f(T − s)L)−2ev ≤
1
δ(1 + f(T − s))2
γ(s)d(k,v)(1 + d(k, v)(1− γ(s))
(1− γ(s))2 .
Now notice that in (6.2) the first term and all the terms in the last sum on the right hand
side are positive, whereas all the terms in the second line sum are negative. Therefore we
have the following upper bound
Cov(Xu(t), Xv(t)) ≤σ2
∫ t
0
(1 + f(T − t))2
δ(1 + f(T − s))2
{
γ(s)d(u,v)(1 + d(u, v)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2 (6.4)
+
∑
k∈P (u,2)
e>uA
2ek
(
γ(t)
δ
)2 γ(s)d(k,v)(1 + d(k, v)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2
}
ds.
The function d 7→ γ(t)d(1 + d(1 − γ(t))) is non-increasing on [0,∞) since γ(t) ∈ [0, 1).
Moreover, for all k such that d(k, u) ≤ 2, we have |d(k, v)− d(u, v)| ≤ 2, and in particular
d(k, v) ≥ d(u, v)− 2. We consider two cases separately:
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(1) First, suppose d(u, v) ≥ 2. Since d(k, v) ≥ d(u, v) − 2 by the above argument,
monotonicity of d 7→ γ(t)d(1 + d(1− γ(t))) lets us estimate∑
k∈P (u,2)
e>uA
2ek
(
γ(t)
δ
)2 γ(s)d(k,v)(1 + d(k, v)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2
≤
(
γ(t)
δ
)2 γ(s)d(u,v)−2(1 + (d(u, v)− 2)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2
∑
k∈P (u,2)
e>uA
2ek
≤ γ(t)2γ(s)
d(u,v)−2(1 + (d(u, v)− 2)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2 .
Indeed, the last step uses the fact that
∑
k∈P (u,2) e
>
uA
2ek is precisely the number of
paths of length two originating from vertex u, which is clearly bounded from above
by δ2. Moreover, since f is increasing by Proposition 3.3, it is straightforward to
check that γ is decreasing. Therefore 0 ≤ γ(t) ≤ γ(s) ≤ 1 for all t ≥ s ≥ 0, and the
above quantity is further bounded from above by
γ(s)d(u,v)(1 + d(u, v)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2 .
Plugging this back in (6.4), and using the inequality 1+f(T−t)1+f(T−s) ≤ 1 which again
follows from the fact that f is increasing and nonnegative, we get
Cov(Xu(t), Xv(t)) ≤ 2σ
2
δ
∫ t
0
γ(s)d(u,v)(1 + d(u, v)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2 ds. (6.5)
(2) Suppose next that d(u, v) = 1. We then use the bounds γ(t)d(1 + d(1 − γ(t))) ≤ 1
and
∑
k∈P (u,2) e
>
uA
2ek ≤ δ2 to estimate∑
k∈P (u,2)
e>uA
2ek
(
γ(t)
δ
)2 γ(s)d(k,v)(1 + d(k, v)(1− γ(s)))
(1− γ(s))2
≤ γ(t)
2
(1− γ(s))2 ≤
γ(s)2
(1− γ(s))2 ≤
γ(s)d(u,v)+1(1 + d(u, v)(1− γ(s))
(1− γ(s))2 .
Plugging this into (6.4) shows that the same bound (6.5) is valid for d(u, v) = 1.
Now, recall that γ(·) is decreasing. Since f(T ) ≤ cT by Proposition 3.2, we have
0 < γ(0) = cf(T )1+cf(T ) ≤ cT1+cT < 1. Set γ := cT1+cT . The function y 7→ y
d(1+d(1−y))
(1−y)2 is easily
seen to be increasing on [0, 1) for any d ≥ 0. Thus, from (6.5) we finally deduce the desired
upper bound
Cov(Xu(t), Xv(t)) ≤ 2σ2tγ
d(u,v)(1 + d(u, v)(1− γ))
δ(1− γ)2 .
Using the same arguments for the second term in (6.2), which is the only negative term,
we obtain a similar lower bound for Cov(Xu(t), Xv(t)), which concludes the proof.
7. Asymptotic regimes
In this section, we provide the derivations of the large-n asymptotics of the in-equilibrium
processes. We will first prove Theorem 2.6, then Theorem 2.11, and lastly we will focus
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on the examples we discussed in Section 2.4, and in particular prove Corollary 2.9 and
Proposition 2.14.
7.1. Large-scale asymptotics on transitive graphs: Proof of Theorem 2.6. Part
(1) of Theorem 2.6 is a consequence of Proposition 3.2, so we focus on parts (2–4). Let {Gn}
be a sequence of finite transitive graphs, and let {µGn} be the corresponding sequence of
empirical eigenvalue distributions defined by (2.8). We assume that {µGn} converges weakly
to a probability measure µ. Recall that the initial states are XGn(0) = 0, and recall from
(2.7) that each XGni (t) is Gaussian with mean zero and variance
VGn(t) := σ
2
∫ t
0
∫
[−2,0]
(
1− fGn(T − t)λ
1− fGn(T − s)λ
)2
µGn(dλ)ds.
7.1.1. Convergence of XGnkn (t): Proof of (2). By Proposition 3.2, we know fGn = fµGn
converges uniformly to the function fµ given by (2.10). Defining Vµ(t) as in (2.11), it follows
from this uniform convergence and the weak convergence of µGn to µ that VGn(t)→ Vµ(t).
Therefore XGnkn (t) ∼ VGn(t) converges weakly to N (0, Vµ(t)) as n→∞.
7.1.2. Convergence of the empirical measure: Proof of (3). We next show that the (random)
empirical measure
mGn(t) :=
1
|Gn|
∑
v∈Gn
δ
XGnv (t)
converges to the Gaussian measure N (0, Vµ(t)), for each t ∈ [0, T ]. In fact, it suffices to
show that mGn(t) concentrates around its mean, in the following sense: For any bounded
1-Lipschitz function h, it holds that
lim
n→∞E
[∣∣∣∣∫ h dmGn(t)− E∫ h dmGn(t)∣∣∣∣2
]
= 0. (7.1)
Indeed, once (7.1) is established, it follows from the transitivity of Gn that E
∫
h dmGn(t) =
E[h(XGnkn (t))], where kn ∈ Gn is arbitrary. Since the law of XGnkn (t) converges weakly to
m(t) := N (0, Vµ(t)), we deduce that
∫
h dmGn(t)→ ∫ h dm(t) in probability, and the claim
follows.
Before proving (7.1), we digress to state a lemma pertaining to the degrees. Recall that
each vertex in the transitive graph Gn has the same degree, denoted δ(Gn).
Lemma 7.1. We have µGn → δ−1 if and only if δ(Gn) → ∞. If µGn → µ 6= δ−1, then
supn δ(Gn) <∞.
Proof. Recall that LGn =
1
δ(Gn)
AGn − I, where AGn is the adjacency matrix of the graph
Gn. Then
Var(µGn) =
∫
[−2,0]
(1 + λ)2 µGn(dx) =
1
n
Tr
( 1
δ(Gn)2
A2Gn
)
=
1
nδ(Gn)2
n∑
i=1
(A2Gn)ii.
Since (A2Gn)ii = δ(Gn) is exactly the number of paths of length 2 starting and ending at
vertex i, we get Var(µGn) = 1/δ(Gn). Thus, if µGn → µ weakly for some probability
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measure µ on [−2, 0], we have
Var(µ) =
∫
[−2,0]
(1 + λ)2 µ(dx) = lim
n→∞
1
δ(Gn)
. (7.2)
The second claim follows immediately. It is straightforward to check that µGn → δ−1 if and
only if Var(µGn)→ 0, and the first claim follows. 
We now turn toward the proof of (7.1), for a fixed bounded 1-Lipschitz function h. We
achieve this by applying the Gaussian Poincare´ inequality and then using the covariance
estimate of 2.12. To this end, fix t ∈ [0, T ] and n, and suppose for simplicity that Gn has
n vertices. Let Σn denote the n × n covariance matrix of XGn(t), and let M denote its
symmetric square root. Then XGn(t)
d
= MZ for a standard Gaussian Z in Rn. Define
F : Rn → R by
F (x) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
h(e>i Mx).
Then F (Z)
d
=
∫
h dmGn(t). Noting that ∂iF (x) =
1
n
∑n
j=1 h
′(e>j Mx)Mji, we get
|∇F (x)|2 =
n∑
i=1
1
n2
( n∑
j=1
h′(e>j Mx)Mji
)2 ≤ 1
n2
n∑
j,k=1
h′(e>j Mx)h
′(e>kMx)Σjk
≤ 1
n2
n∑
j,k=1
|Σnjk|,
where in the last inequality we used the fact that h is 1-Lipschitz. Now, applying the
Gaussian Poincare´ inequality [4, Theorem 3.20], we find
E
[∣∣∣∣∫ h dmGn(t)− E∫ h dmGn(t)∣∣∣∣2
]
= Var(F (Z)) ≤ E[|∇F (Z)|2] ≤ 1
n2
n∑
j,k=1
|Σnjk|. (7.3)
It remains to show that this converges to zero as n→∞.
Let  > 0. By Proposition 2.12, |Σnjk| converges to 0 as dGn(j, k) → ∞, where dGn
denotes the graph distance in Gn. Choose m ∈ N large enough so that |Σnjk| ≤  for all
n ∈ N and j, k ∈ Gn with dGn(j, k) > m. For k ∈ Gn let Bn(j,m) denote the set of vertices
in Gn of distance at most m from j. Because Gn is transitive, the cardinality |Bn(j,m)|
does not depend on j ∈ Gn, and we denote by |Bn(m)| this common value. Then, we use
the bound on |Σnjk| from Proposition 2.12 to get
1
n2
n∑
j,k=1
|Σnjk| ≤ +
1
n2
n∑
j=1
∑
k∈Bn(j,m)
|Σnjk| ≤ +
|Bn(m)|
nδ(Gn)
2σ2T
(1− γ)2 ,
where we used the fact that γd(1+d(1−γ)) is decreasing in d ≥ 0 since 0 ≤ γ < 1 and is thus
bounded by 1. We now distinguish two cases. If δ(Gn)→∞, then we use |Bn(m)|/n ≤ 1 to
send n→∞ and then → 0 to get that (7.3) converges to zero. On the other hand, suppose
δ(Gn) does not converge to infinity. Then necessarily supn δ(Gn) <∞ by Lemma 7.1, since
µGn converges weakly by assumption. Using the obvious bound |Bn(m)| ≤ δ(Gn)m, we can
again send n→∞ and then → 0 to get that (7.3) converges to zero. This completes the
proof of part (3) of Theorem 2.6.
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7.1.3. Convergence of the value: Proof of (4). Recall the identity for the value of the game
from (2.9). Since fGn(T )→ fµ(T ) by Proposition 3.2 and µGn → µ weakly, it follows that
Val(Gn) = −σ
2
2
log
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− fGn(T )λ
µGn(dλ)→ −
σ2
2
log
∫
[−2,0]
−λ
1− fµ(T )λµ(dλ).
This gives (4) and completes the proof of Theorem 2.6.
7.2. Approximate equilibria: Proof of Theorem 2.11. We begin toward proving The-
orem 2.11 by first studying the control αMF introduced therein. The following lemma shows
that it arises essentially as the equilibrium of a mean field game, or equivalently as the op-
timal control for a certain control problem:
Lemma 7.2. Define αMF : [0, T ]× R→ R
αMF(t, x) := − cx
1 + c(T − t) . (7.4)
Let (Ω′,F ′,F′,P′) be any filtered probability space supporting an F′-Brownian motion W and
a F′-progressively measurable real-valued process (β(t))t∈[0,T ] satisfying E
∫ T
0 β(t)
2dt < ∞.
Let X be the unique strong solution of the SDE
dX(t) = αMF(t,X(t))dt+ σdW (t), X(0) = 0,
and define (Y (t))t∈[0,T ] by
dY (t) = β(t)dt+ σdW (t), Y (0) = 0.
Then
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|αMF(t,X(t))|2dt+ c|X(T )|2
]
≤ 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|β(t)|2dt+ c|Y (T )|2
]
Proof. We study the HJB equation corresponding to this control problem, which is
∂tv(t, x) + inf
a∈R
(
a∂xv(t, x) +
1
2
a2
)
+
1
2
σ2∂xxv(t, x) = 0,
or equivalently
∂tv(t, x)− 1
2
|∂xv(t, x)|2 + 1
2
σ2∂xxv(t, x) = 0,
with terminal condition v(T, x) = cx2/2. The ansatz v(t, x) = a(t)x2 +b(t) yields a classical
solution, where a and b are functions satisfying
a′(t)− 2a(t)2 = 0, b′(t) + σ2a(t) = 0,
with terminal conditions a(T ) = c/2 and b(T ) = 0. We deduce
a(t) =
1
2
c
1 + c(T − t) , b(t) =
σ2
2
log(1 + c(T − t)).
Therefore the optimal Markovian control is −∂xv(t, x) = −2a(t)x = αMF(t, x). This com-
pletes the proof, by a standard verification argument [37, Theorem 3.5.2]. 
Now let G be a fixed finite graph with vertex set V = {1, . . . , n}. Let us again omit
the G superscripts from the notation, with A = AG and J = JG denoting the control set
and value function from Section 2.1. Let α = (αMFi )
n
i=1, and for β ∈ A and i ∈ V let
(β,α−i) := (αMF1 , . . . , αMFi−1, β, α
MF
i+1, . . . , α
MF
n ). To be clear about the notation, we write
αMF without a subscript to denote the control in (7.4), whereas αMFi (t,x) = α
MF(t, xi) for
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i ∈ V and x ∈ Rn. If v ∈ V has degG(v) = 0, then (recalling the definition (2.3) of the cost
function for isolated vertices) Lemma 7.2 ensures that
Jv(α) = inf
β∈A
Jv(β,α
−v),
so we may take v = 0 as claimed in Theorem 2.11. Thus, we assume henceforth that v ∈ G
is a fixed non-isolated vertex, so that degG(v) ≥ 1.
Now define
β := argmin
β′∈A
Jv(β
′,α−v).
(Or take a δ-optimizer in case no optimizer exists, and send δ → 0 at the end of the proof.)
We aim to prove that
Jv(β,α
−v) ≥ Jv(α)− σ
2cT
1 + cT
√
cT (2 + cT )
degG(v)
. (7.5)
Define the state processes X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) as the unique strong
solutions of the SDEs
dXi(t) = α
MF(t,Xi(t))dt+ σdWi(t), Xi(0) = 0, i ∈ V, (7.6)
dYi(t) = α
MF(t, Yi(t))dt+ σdWi(t), Yi(0) = 0, i ∈ V \ {v},
dYv(t) = β(t,Y (t))dt+ σdWv(t), Yv(0) = 0.
Note that Yi ≡ Xi for i 6= v. The values for the player v, under αMF and the deviation β,
are then, respectively,
Jv(α) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
|αMF(t,Xv(t))|2dt+ c
∣∣∣∣∣ 1degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )−Xv(T )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ,
Jv(β,α
−v) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt+ c
∣∣∣∣∣ 1degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )− Yv(T )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 ,
where we recall that u ∼ v means that u is adjacent to v. We prove (7.5) in three steps:
(1) We show that
Jv(β,α
−v) ≥ 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt+ c|Yv(T )|2
]
+
cσ2T
2 degG(v)(1 + cT )
− c
√
σ2T 2
degG(v)(1 + cT )
E
∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt.
(2) We then estimate
E
∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt ≤ cσ2T 2 + cT
1 + cT
.
(3) Finally, we show that
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt+ c|Yv(T )|2
]
≥ Jv(αMF )− cσ
2T
2 degG(v)(1 + cT )
.
which will conclude the proof.
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Step 1. We start with
Jv(β,α
−v)− 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt+ c|Yv(T )|2
]
=
c
2
E
∣∣∣∣∣ 1degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )− Yv(T )
∣∣∣∣∣
2
− |Yv(T )|2

=
c
2
E
( 1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )
)2− cE[ 1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )Yv(T )
]
.
From the form of the SDE (7.6) and the definition of αMF, we find that (Xu(T ))u∈V are
i.i.d. Gaussians with mean zero and variance σ2T/(1 + cT ). We deduce
E
( 1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )
)2 = σ2T
degG(v)(1 + cT )
. (7.7)
For the second term, we note
E
[
1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )Yv(T )
]
= E
[
1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )
∫ T
0
β(t,Y (t))dt
]
,
and we use Cauchy-Schwarz to bound this term in absolute value by√
σ2T 2
degG(v)(1 + cT )
E
∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt.
Plugging these two terms back in our first inequality we obtain claim (1) above.
Step 2. To find a bound for E
∫ T
0 |β(t,Y (t))|2dt, we use the definition of β as the minimizer
of Jv(β,α
−v). In particular, Jv(β,α−v) ≤ Jv(0,α−v). Expand this inequality, discarding
the non-negative terminal cost on the left-hand side, and noting that the state process of
player v when adopting the zero control is precisely (σWv(t))t∈[0,T ], to get
E
∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt ≤ cE
[∣∣∣ 1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )− σWv(T )
∣∣∣2] .
Using (7.7) and the independence of the Xu(T ) and Wv(T ), the right-hand side equals
cσ2T
degG(v)(1 + cT )
+ cσ2T ≤ cσ2T 2 + cT
1 + cT
.
Step 3. We use Lemma 7.2 to deduce that
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|β(t,Y (t))|2dt+ c|Yv(T )|2
]
≥ 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|αMF(t,Xv(t))|2dt+ c|Xv(T )|2
]
.
The right-hand side can be written as
Jv(α) +
c
2
E
[
|Xv(T )|2 −
∣∣∣ 1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )−Xv(T )
∣∣∣2] .
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Since (Xu(T ))u∈V are i.i.d. with mean zero and variance σ2T/(1 + cT ), as in (7.7) we get
c
2
E
[
|Xv(T )|2 −
∣∣∣ 1
degG(v)
∑
u∼v
Xu(T )−Xv(T )
∣∣∣2] = − cσ2T
2degG(v)(1 + cT )
.
7.3. Examples. We next specialize the results to the examples discussed in Section 2.4.
In particular, we prove Corollary 2.9 and Proposition 2.14.
7.3.1. Dense case: Proof of Corollary 2.9. As in Corollary 2.9, let {Gn} be a sequence of
transitive graphs such that each vertex of Gn has common degree δ(Gn) ≥ 1. The claim
that µGn → δ−1 if and only if δ(Gn) → ∞ holds as a consequence of Lemma 7.1. In this
case, we apply Theorem 2.6 with µ = δ−1. The function Qµ therein is then Qδ−1(x) = 1+x,
and the function fδ−1 satisfies f
′
δ−1(t) = c with fδ−1(0) = 0. Hence, fδ−1(t) = ct, and the
variance in (2.11) simplifies to
Vδ−1(t) = σ
2
∫ t
0
(
1 + c(T − t)
1 + c(T − s)
)2
ds = σ2
t(1 + c(T − t))
1 + cT
.
Recall now from the proof of Lemma 7.1 that Var(µGn) = 1/δ(Gn). Letting C0 =
1
2c
2t2 +
1
6c
3T 3, the bounds of Proposition 3.2 show that |fGn(t) − ct| ≤ C0/δ(Gn). The function
(1 − λx)/(1 − λy) is Lipschitz in (x, y) ∈ [0, cT ]2, uniformly in λ ∈ [−2, 0]. From this it
is straightforward to argue that |VGn(t) − Vδ−1(t)| ≤ C1/δ(Gn) for some constant C1, and
similarly for the convergence of the value using the identity (2.9). Lastly, the SDE (2.15)
admits the solution X(t) =
∫ t
0
1+c(T−t)
1+c(T−s)σdW (s), and it is then straightforward to identify
the Gaussian law X(t) ∼ N (0, Vδ−1(t)).
7.3.2. Cycle graph case: Proof of Proposition 2.14. We begin by simplifying the expression
of Q′, with Q = Qµ defined as in 2.18. Differentiate under the integral sign to get
Q′(x) = Q(x)
∫ 1
0
1− cos (2piu)
1 + x− x cos (2piu)du =
Q(x)
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
1− cos (u)
1 + x− x cos (u)du.
We will first assume that x > 0 and then show that the formula is still valid for x = 0. We
perform the change of variable t = tan(u/2), using cos(u) = 1−t
2
1+t2
, to get∫ pi
−pi
1− cos(u)
1 + x− x cos(u)du =
∫ ∞
−∞
1− 1−t2
1+t2
1 + x− x1−t2
1+t2
2
1 + t2
dt =
∫ ∞
−∞
4t2
(1 + t2(1 + 2x))(1 + t2)
dt
=
2
x
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1
1 + t2
− 1
1 + t2(1 + 2x)
)
dt
=
2
x
[
arctan(t)− 1√
1 + 2x
arctan(t
√
1 + 2x)
]∞
t=−∞
= 2pi
1 + 2x−√1 + 2x
x(1 + 2x)
=: 2pih(x).
We thus find Q′(x) = Q(x)h(x) for x > 0, and if we define h(0) := 1 then the formula
extends by continuity to x = 0. Using Q(0) = 1, we find Q(x) = exp
∫ x
0 h(u)du, and we
compute this integral using the change of variables v =
√
1 + 2u:∫ x
0
h(u)du =
∫ x
0
1 + 2u−√1 + 2u
u(1 + 2u)
du =
∫ √1+2x
1
2
v + 1
dv = log
(
1
2
(
√
1 + 2x+ 1 + x)
)
.
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Therefore
Q(x) =
1
2
(
√
1 + 2x+ 1 + x), and Q′(x) =
1
2
(
1√
1 + 2x
+ 1
)
.
Recall from Proposition 2.14 that we defined Φ(x) = log(1 +
√
1 + 2x)−√1 + 2x+ x+ 12 ,
and f(t) := fµ(t) := Φ
−1 (log 2 + ct−12 ). It remains to show that f satisfies the desired ODE
f ′(t) = cQ′(f(t)) with f(0) = 0, where we recall that this ODE is well-posed by Proposition
3.2. Note that Φ is continuous and increasing on R+ and maps R+ to [log 2 − 1/2,∞).
Hence, the inverse Φ−1 is well defined on [log 2− 1/2,∞) with f(0) = Φ−1(log 2− 1/2) = 0.
Straightforward calculus yields Φ′(x) =
√
1+2x
1+
√
1+2x
and thus Q′(x) = 12Φ′(x) , and we find that
indeed f ′(t) = c2Φ′(f(t)) = cQ
′(f(t)), which concludes the proof of Proposition 2.14.
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